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FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY: THE UNITED STATES AND
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ALLISON M. DuSSIAst
ABSTRACT
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,
in which the Court concluded that a claim that a neutral and generally
applicable criminal law burdens religious conduct need not be evaluated
under the "compelling interest" test set out by the Court in Sherbert v.
Verner (1963). The Court relied on two recently decided cases, Bowen v.
Roy (1986) and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion (1988). All three of these cases rejected Free Exercise Clause claims
brought by American Indians. Following the Smith decision, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore the
compelling interest test to all claims that the government has substantial-
ly burdened religious exercise.
This Article analyzes and critiques the post-Smith responses to Indi-
an religious freedom claims made by two groups: federal government
officials making public lands management-related decisions and federal
courts addressing claims related to Indian religious freedom. The primary
focus is on claims involving sacred sites located on federal lands. These
claims are in many ways unique to Indian religions, which, in contrast
with mainstream religions, commonly share the belief that particular sites
are imbued with sacredness and are consequently the only location at
which certain ceremonies can be conducted. The presence of sacred sites
on lands that were taken from tribes in the past to satisfy non-Indian re-
source demands and are today held as public lands can lead to conflicts
between Indian religious exercise rights and non-Indian desires to use the
lands for commercial or recreational purposes.
First, the Article focuses on cases in which federal officials have
taken account of Indian religious exercise needs in developing land man-
agement plans and have subsequently faced Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to their actions. Second, it examines cases in which officials have
made decisions that burden Indian religious exercise on public lands,
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prompting challenges under RFRA. When confronting Establishment
Clause challenges to management plans, the Government has empha-
sized the political and trust relationships between the United States and
tribes, and has argued that accommodations appropriately alleviate gov-
ernment-imposed burdens on religious exercise. In responding to Indian
claims that government decisions substantially, and unjustifiably, burden
the plaintiffs' religious exercise, however, the Government tells a differ-
ent story. Courts have tended to side with the Government in both kinds
of cases. Third, the Article discusses the lessons learned from this analy-
sis about the need for heightened protection of religious exercise at sa-
cred sites and offers suggestions on seeking a path toward ensuring that
Indian religious practitioners are able to enjoy the level of religious free-
dom long provided to other Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
We also have a religion ... .
If we are to exist as humans, we are allowed to have a religion....
[W]e are looking at a bleak future ... in which we do not have the
right to practice our religion.... The only difference between us and
the "other Americans" is that we have dark skin and dark hair.2
Religion is behavior and not mere belief.3
The year 2010 marked the twentieth anniversary of the landmark
Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause decision Employment Division v.
Smith.4 In Smith, five Justices concluded that a claim that a neutral and
generally applicable criminal law that burdens religious conduct need not
be evaluated under the "compelling interest" test set out by the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner' and used by lower courts to evaluate free exercise
claims for decades.6 The Court gave its blessing to the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to two members of the Native American Church who
had been dismissed from their jobs for sacramental use of peyote.7 The
Smith majority relied on two recently decided cases in which the Court
had also rejected American Indian free exercise claims, Bowen v. Roy8
and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.9 Given
that Indian religious claims were at the heart of what Congress'o and
Supreme Court Justices" identified in Smith as an important change of
I. Red Jacket, Seneca Chief Remarks on Indian Religion (1805), in INDIAN SPEECHES;
DELIVERED BY FARMER'S BROTHER AND RED JACKET, Two SENECA CHIEFS 4-8 (James D. Bemis
ed., 1809), reprinted in WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN 213 (1964).
2. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 27 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings] (statement of William
Nouyi Yang on behalf of the Hmong-Lao Unity Ass'n) (commenting on autopsies performed in
violation of Hmong religious beliefs).
3. WISDOM FOR THE SOUL: FIVE MILLENNIA OF PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SPIRITUAL HEALING 95
(Larry Chang ed., 2006) (quoting Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan).
4. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
5. 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963).
6. See id at 883-84. The other four Justices (O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall)
believed that the compelling interest test should be applied to such claims, although they disagreed
as to the result of applying the test in Smith. Compare id at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Blackmun, Brennan, & Marshall, J.J., as to Parts I and II of the opinion), with
id. at 907, 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, J.J.).
7. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 890.
8. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
9. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
10. In enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), see discussion infra Part 11,
Congress referred to the Smith decision as having "virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion" and
praised "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings," which the statute was
intended to restore. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), invali-
dated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as
applied to the states in City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
11. In her concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor said that the "holding dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence." Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion described the Court as effectuat-
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direction in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, it seems that any effort
to examine this development and its impact would be incomplete without
a consideration of Indian religious freedom claims post-Smith. Some
organizers of law school conferences discussing Smith's impact appar-
ently saw otherwise and left Indian religious freedom cases completely
off the agenda. 2 When it comes to the "first liberty," the rights and con-
cerns of the "First Americans" apparently were not considered worthy of
attention.
Although conference agendas may alone seem of little import, a
more significant concern is whether the omission of Indian religious
freedom cases as an important topic of discussion in these settings is
indicative of a broader indifference, or even hostility, toward Indian reli-
gious rights. At the most basic level, this omission raises the question of
whether anyone-besides Indians-cares about Indian religious freedom.
To put it another way, have Indian religious freedom claims become so
marginalized, despite their central role in the development of contempo-
rary Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, that they are of concern only to
Indians (and Indian law scholars)? And if this is indeed the case, what
does these claims' omission from the dominant narrative of American
religious freedom law say about their likelihood of success, particularly
in a legal landscape in which adherents of non-mainstream religions need
to rely on the political process for religious accommodations-a setting
in which (as Justice Scalia blithely stated in Smith) such adherents are at
a disadvantage?13
To explore these questions, this Article analyzes the post-Smith re-
sponses to Indian religious freedom claims made by two groups-federal
government officials making public lands management-related decisions
and federal courts addressing claims related to Indian religious free-
dom-to gauge the extent to which these groups are supportive of, indif-
ing "a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution." Id.
at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. Articles related to the twentieth anniversary of Smith were published in the South Dakota
Law Review in 2010 and in the Cardozo Law Review and Texas Tech Law Review in 2011. See
Symposium, Criminal Law and the First Amendment: Should Free Exercise of Religion Ever Be a
Defense to an Otherwise Valid Criminal Law, or Did Smith Get It Right?, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV.
239 (2011); Symposium, The Twenty Year Anniversary of Employment Division v. Smith: Reas-
sessing the Free Exercise Clause and the Intersection Between Religion and the Law, 55 S.D. L.
REV. (2010); Symposium, Twenty Years After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twen-
tieth Century's Landmark Case on the Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011). Only the South Dakota Law Review conference included a panel
addressing Indian religious exercise. See USD NALSA Chapter Hosts Native American Law Sympo-
sium, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.usd.edu/press/news/news.cfin?nid=1882.
13. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("Values that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.... It
may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disad-
vantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred . . . .").
3512012]
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ferent to, or even hostile toward, Indian religious freedom.14 This Arti-
cle's primary focus is on claims involving American Indian sacred sites
located on federal lands. These claims are in many ways unique to Indian
religions. Although other religions certainly hold particular places, such
as temples, churches, synagogues, or mosques, to be holy, they tend not
to view the land on which places of worship are located as being itself
imbued with sacredness. As a result, if a particular place of worship is no
longer available for use, religious practices can be relocated without los-
ing their significance and efficacy. A new site for worship can be conse-
crated as the old one is deconsecrated-a practice that is usually not pos-
sible with Indian religious practices related to specific sacred sites."
The presence of sacred sites on federal lands-lands that were taken
from tribes to satisfy non-Indian demands for access to Indian land and
resources--can lead to conflicts between the needs of worshippers seek-
ing to enjoy free exercise rights in still sacred areas and the desire of
other users to engage in activities allowed under land management plans
and policies. Whereas land managers' protection of religious uses at
some sites indicates support for religious freedom, the uniqueness of
Indians' needs with respect to sacred sites suggests that these needs are
vulnerable to being disregarded in the face of competing land use de-
mands.
Part I focuses on four cases in which federal officials have taken ac-
count of Indian religious freedom in decision making as to public lands
and have subsequently had to defend their actions when non-Indians
challenged them on Establishment Clause grounds. Part II examines cas-
es in which officials have made decisions that burden Indian religious
exercise on public lands and that are consequently challenged under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).16 Congress enacted
RFRA in response to Smith, to restore the compelling interest test to all
claims that the government has substantially burdened religious exer-
cise.'7 Federal courts have tended to side with the Government in both
the Establishment Clause and RFRA cases despite the conflicting stories
that the Government has presented in these two categories of cases about
its relationship with, and responsibilities to, Indian tribes. Part III dis-
cusses the lessons that can be drawn from the analysis in Parts I and II
about the impact of RFRA, and of pre- and post-RFRA jurisprudence, on
Indian religious freedom claims. The Article concludes by offering final
thoughts on the challenges that continue to face Indian religious practi-
14. A future article will examine the response of other religious groups to Indian religious
freedom claims.
15. See Jane Hubert, Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of Sacredness, in SACRED SITES, SACRED
PLACES 9, 13-14 (David L. Carmichael et al. eds., 1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), invalidatedby City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
17. See id. ("The purposes of this chapter are ... to restore the compelling interest test ... and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened . . . .").
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tioners, who are merely seeking the protection for their religious exercise
that most other Americans take for granted.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO SACRED SITES
PROTECTION: THE GOVERNMENT AS FRIEND
At the centre of the Native American religious system is the affirma-
tion that spiritual power is infused throughout the environment in
general, as well as at interconnected special places, and that knowl-
edgeable people are participants in that power.18
[I]n furtherance of Federal treaties, and in order to protect and pre-
serve Indian religious practices, . . . [i]n managing Federal lands,
each executive branch agency . . . shall . . . (1) accommodate access
to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites ... and (2) avoid ad-
versely affecting the[ir] physical integrity ... 19
In an essay written for a conference marking Employment Division
v. Smith's twentieth anniversary, Professor Steven D. Smith began by
noting his assumption that religious freedom, "the legally recognized and
protected right of people to believe, worship, and live in accordance with
their religious faith, subject only to the overriding needs of social order,"
is "a good thing." 20 This assumption is not, he noted, as "platitudinous,
or as secure" as it may seem because "religious freedom has, and always
has had, its opponents." 2 1 Looking at this statement from a historical
perspective, it is difficult to think of any group for whom it is truer than
the indigenous peoples of the United States. Opponents of American
Indian religious freedom long existed both in the government and in so-
ciety. Indians' traditional religions were targeted for destruction and for
replacement by Christianity under government policies that ultimately
identified specific practices and ceremonies as punishable "Indian Of-
fenses."22
Professor Smith also observed that by the time the Constitution was
adopted, "the view that imposed religious orthodoxy was unnecessary,
undesirable, and unjust"23 had come to prevail and the project of "im-
posed religious orthodoxy was already on its last legs."
24 For American
Indians, though, this was not the case. Rather than ending with the adop-
tion of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, government-supported ef-
18. Dorothea J. Theodoratus & Frank LaPena, Wintu Sacred Geography of Northern Califor-
nia, in SACRED SITES, SACRED PLACES 20, 22 (David L. Carmichael et al. eds., 1994).
19. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
20. Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be
a Greater Loss Now Than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZo L. REV. 2033, 2033 (2011).
21. Id.
22. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 788-89 (1997).
23. Smith, supra note 20, at 2035.
24. Id. at 2037.
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forts to convert Indians to Christianity gathered steam over the course of
the nineteenth century, peaking during the years of President Ulysses S.
Grant's Peace Policy. 25 Under the Peace Policy, reservations were as-
signed to particular religious denominations and groups for the purpose
of "Christianizing" the Indians.2 6 Although European- and early Ameri-
can-imposed religious orthodoxy had favored particular Christian de-
nominations, Indian policy supported the missionary efforts of a variety
of Christian denominations. Only at the end of the nineteenth century did
the federal government, swayed by anti-Roman Catholic sentiment, end
federal funding for Christian denominations that were running Indian
schools-an endeavor in which the waning of Protestant interest had led
to Roman Catholic dominance.27 Thereafter, for the next several decades,
religious instruction (of a decidedly Protestant character) of Indian chil-
dren continued in federally operated Indian schools.2 8 For Indians, then,
blatant government opposition to religious freedom, and efforts to im-
pose religious orthodoxy, long survived the adoption of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.
Even today, Professor Smith reminds us, religious freedom has its
opponents. Therefore, "if we think religious freedom is a good thing, we
cannot be complacent"; we must identify "who or what the threats to
religious freedom are, and then make arguments and craft strategies to
protect religious freedom against such threats." 29 Accordingly, the first
task for supporters of Indian religious exercise rights related to sacred
sites is to determine whether the federal government continues to pose a
threat to Indian religious exercise by its treatment of Indian sacred sites
located on public lands.
A. Pointers Toward Protection from Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the President
A number of developments beginning in the 1970s indicated a
commitment by the federal government to repudiate the past policies of
explicit suppression of Indian religions. In 1978, Congress enacted the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) 30 after receiving ex-
tensive testimony by Indian religious practitioners as to the multiple
ways in which their constitutional rights continued to be disregarded.
25. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 778-79.
26. See id. at 781.
27. See id. at 784-85. Although direct government funding of sectarian schools for Indian
children ended, tribes were free to direct that their own trust funds be used to fund sectarian schools,
in keeping with their free exercise rights. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908).
28. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 786-87.
29. Smith, supra note 20, at 2034.
30. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (Aug. 11,
1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)).
31. See American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the S. Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. III (1978) [hereinafter AIRFA Hearings].
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Witnesses such as Dale Old Horn spoke of the continuing quest for equal
treatment:
Indian people who have held onto these old ways are still hoping
for the formulation of Federal policy so that they can at once be rec-
ognized as any religious group ... in America as having the same
freedoms, the same rights, that [are] afforded to all peoples of this
country. 32
Speaking in the Senate hearings preceding AIRFA's enactment, Senator
James Abourezk noted the importance of religious rights and the barriers
to their enjoyment by Indians:
One of the most fundamental precepts in the founding of our coun-
try is the freedom of religion. As citizens, Indians have an inherent
right to the free exercise of their religion.... Unfortunately, in recent
years, there have been increasing incidents of infringement of the re-
ligious rights of American Indians. New barriers have been raised
against the pursuit of their traditional culture, of which the religion is
an integral part. 33
Senator Abourezk attributed the imposition of these barriers to the
"[1]ack of knowledge, unawareness, insensitivity and neglect [that] are
the keynotes of the Federal Government's interaction with traditional
Indians' religions and cultures." 34 This situation was exacerbated by
skepticism about the legitimacy of Indian religions:
[M]any non-Indian officials [believe] that because Indian religious
practices are different than their own[,] ... they somehow do not
have the same status as a "real" religion, yet, the effect on the indi-
vidual whose religious customs are violated or infringed is as intense
as if he had been Protestant, Catholic or Jewish.35
There was a need for recognition of the fact that "America does not need
to violate the religions of her native peoples," that "[t]here is room for
and great value in the cultural and religious diversity," and that Ameri-
cans "would all be poorer if these American Indian religions disappeared
from the face of the Earth."36 To prevent this loss from occurring, Con-
gress needed to make "a clear statement . . . that this country will contin-
ue to fully respect and protect religious freedom of all" and to require an
examination of "our laws, regulations, and enforcement procedures to
insure that such a statement becomes a reality." 37 To this end, all gov-
32. Id. at 18 (statement of Dale Old Horn, Crow Tribe); see also id at 19 (referring to "the
sense of equalness that we feel we should have as Indian people").
33. Id at I (statement of Sen. James Abourezk).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
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ernment agencies needed to be made "responsible for administering the
laws that provide for Indian religious freedom," and government person-
nel were "not to restrict anything under the Government's jurisdiction as
a religious site.",3 To put these principles into action, AIRFA provided as
follows:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express,
and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo,
Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to
sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to wor-
ship through ceremonials and traditional rites. 39
Relevant federal departments and agencies were to evaluate their policies
and procedures, in consultation with traditional religious leaders, to de-
termine what changes were necessary to protect and preserve Native
- 40American religious rights.
Despite optimistic statements in the AIRFA hearings as to the posi-
tive impact that the statute would have on Indian religious freedom and
on the development of appropriate agency policies, Indian religious prac-
titioners continued to face obstacles to the enjoyment of their free exer-
cise rights, as evidenced by a series of defeats for Indian free exercise
claims in federal district court and courts of appeals.4 1 In 1988, the Su-
preme Court finally weighed in. In Lyng, the Court held, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice (USFS) from permitting timber harvesting and the building of a
logging road in a sacred area in a national forest, even assuming that the
road would "virtually destroy the . . . Indians' ability to practice their
religion."42 The USFS's plans affected an area that is held sacred by the
Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.43 The Court, in an opinion whose
tone at times seemed to indicate outrage at the audacity of the plaintiffs
in challenging land managers' decision making, treated the free exercise
claim as a threat to government property rights" and dismissed AIRFA
as a source of enforceable rights.45
38. Id at 82; see also id. at 83 (explaining that bureaucrats "are going to come to realize that
the Congress is saying 'you cannot restrict anybody's religious freedom, and that includes Indian
religious freedom').
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
40. See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 (2006).
41. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 823-28 (discussing cases leading up to Lyng).
42. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
44. See id. at 453-54.
45. See id. at 454-55.
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At the same time, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated
that the Court's opinion should not be "read to encourage governmental
insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen" and that the govern-
ment's property rights "need not and should not discourage it from ac-
commodating [Indian] religious practices.A 6 Justice Brennan, in dissent,
pointed out that it was "difficult ... to imagine conduct more insensitive
to religious needs than the Government's determination to build a mar-
ginally useful road in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the road
will render the practice of respondents' religion impossible." 47 Given this
reality, Justice O'Connor's encouragement of accommodation seemed
like an empty gesture.
Subsequent developments, however, have demonstrated that federal
land management decisions are at times based on the heightened sensitiv-
ity toward, and respect for, Indian religious needs and concerns that the
Lyng majority opinion encouraged. Such decisions have been prompted
by a number of congressional and executive actions. Amendments to the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) enacted in 1992 made Indian
sacred sites eligible for treatment as "[p]roperties of traditional religious
and cultural importance" (commonly referred to as "traditional cultural
properties," or TCPs) and required agencies managing federal lands to
consult with tribes as to federal undertakings that may affect these prop-
erties. 48 In 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13,007, enti-
tled "Indian Sacred Sites" (the Sacred Sites Order), which requires feder-
al land managers to "(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of
Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid ad-
versely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites." 4 9 The Sa-
cred Sites Order's provisions are triggered by identification of a site as
being sacred by Indians themselves (in contrast to designations of a site
as a TCP, which requires federal government involvement). An earlier
executive memorandum, signed by President Clinton in 1994, highlight-
ed the obligation to work with tribal governments as sovereigns, requir-
ing all federal agencies and departments to "consult, to the greatest ex-
46. Id at 453-54.
47. Id. at 477 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Dussias, supra note 22, at 828-31, 849 (dis-
cussing Lyng). For a thorough analysis of the Lyng litigation and its significance, see Amy Bowers &
Kristen Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Conquest. The Story of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 489, 489 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds.,
2011); Howard J. Vogel, The Clash ofStories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural
Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 759
(2001) (offering an interesting analysis of the Lyng dispute as a cultural conflict between communi-
ties, in which a rights-based approach is more likely to perpetuate conflict than to lead to an appro-
priate resolution).
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a(d)(6)(A)-(B), 470f (2006). For a helpful analysis of the NHPA and its
role in sacred sites protection, see DEAN SUAGEE & JACK F. TROPE, NATIVE SACRED PLACES
PROTECTION LEGAL WORKSHOP: SACRED PLACES TRAINING MATERIALS 22 (2008),
http://www.sacrediand.org/media/Sacred_places training materials.pdf.
49. Exec. Order No. 13,Q07, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
1996 (2006). Such actions are to be taken "to the extent practicable, permitted by law, and not clear-
ly inconsistent with essential agency functions." Id.
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tent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with tribal govern-
ments prior to taking actions that affect federally recognized tribal gov-
ernments."50 Federal officials were directed to undertake activities that
affect tribal rights "in a knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of
tribal sovereignty." 5' The 1996 memorandum was supplemented by Ex-
ecutive Orders 13,084 (in 1998) and 13,175 (in 2000), both entitled
"Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments." 52
More recently, President Obama's 2009 Tribal Consultation Memoran-
dum directed federal agencies to submit detailed plans as to their imple-
mentation of Executive Order 13,175.
Individual federal agencies, acting pursuant to AIRFA, the Sacred
Sites Order, and Executive Branch initiatives related to the tribal-federal
relationship, have developed detailed policies and procedures for con-
sulting with tribes when considering actions that could impact them, in-
cluding with regard to sacred sites. The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), for example, has developed "Guidelines for Conducting Tribal
Consultations."54 Other agencies based within the Department of the
Interior (DOI), such as the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, have taken similar actions. The NPS, for ex-
ample, established an American Indian Liaison Office in 1995 5 and has
developed guidelines for protecting sacred sites and resources and for
consulting with tribes when NPS plans or activities may affect sacred
50. Memorandum on from William J. Clinton on Govemment-to-Government Relations with
Native American Tribal Governments to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 30 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 936 (Apr. 29, 1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1994-05-
02/pdf/WCPD- I 994-05-02-Pg936.pdf.
51. Id; see also Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Government-to-
Government Relationship with Tribal Governments to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-
book2/pdflPPP-2004-book2-doc-pg2l77.pdf.
52. See Exec. Order 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Exec. Order 13,175, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
53. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Tribal Consultation to Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts and Agencies (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/otj/pdflobama-executive-
memol 10509.pdf; see also Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Information &
Regulatory Affairs, on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Gov'ts to Heads of Exec.
Dept's and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies (July 30, 2010) (providing guidance on the
submission of progress reports required by the 2009 presidential memorandum on implementation of
Executive Order 13,175), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/201 0/m l0-33.pdf.
54. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., H-8120-1, GUIDELINES FOR
CONDUCTING TRIBAL CONSULTATION (2004); see also SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 81-87
(discussing BLM procedures relevant to sacred sites protection).
55. See American Indian Liaison Office, 23 CULTURAL RESOURCE MGMT. 43, 43 (2000).
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sites or restrict access or ceremonial use.56 The DOI updated its tribal
consultation policy in 201 1"
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independ-
ent regulatory agency with authority over a number of subjects related to
energy, such as the licensing of non-federal hydropower facilities under
the Federal Power Act, issued a "Policy Statement on Consultation with
Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings" in 2003 "to articulate its
commitment to promote a government-to-government relationship be-
tween itself and federally-recognized Indian tribes."5 The Policy State-
ment "recognizes the sovereignty of tribal nations and the Commission's
trust responsibility to Indian tribes" and established a tribal liaison posi-
tion for the hydroelectric licensing program. 59 FERC's hydroelectric li-
censing process requires that applicants and FERC staff members consult
with tribes as to potential impacts of licenses on tribes, tribal lands, and
tribal interests.co
The U.S. Forest Service is an agency of the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA), which has established an Office of Tribal Relations to
be the primary contact point within the USDA for tribal consultation.6'
The Office has been working with the USFS, which has issued a Nation-
al Resource Guide to American Indian and Alaska Native Relations, on
reviewing sacred sites policy and procedures to examine their effective-
ness in protecting sacred sites.62
Congressional support for tribal religious activities within national
forests was strengthened by the Cultural and Heritage Cooperation Au-
thority provisions of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(the 2008 Farm Bill).63 These provisions were enacted to "strengthen
support for the policy of the United States of protecting and preserving
the traditional, cultural, and ceremonial rites and practices of Indian
56. See SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 87-88 (citing OFFICE OF AM. INDIAN TRUST,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INDIAN TRUST RESOURCES
512 (2012)).
57. See KEN SALAZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3317, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES (Dec. 1, 2011), available at
http://alaska.fws.gov/extemal/pdf/so_3317_tribalconsultationpolicy.pdf.
58. Policy Statement on Consultation with Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,452, 46,452 (July 23, 2003).
59. Id.
60. See SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 92 (citing 18 C.F.R. §§ 5.1(d), 5.2(b)(3),
5.5(b)(8)(v), 5.6(d), 5.7 (2012)); see also Christy McCann, Dammed If You Do, Damned If You
Don't: FERC's Tribal Consultation Requirement and the Hydropower Re-Licensing at Post Falls
Dam, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 415 (2006) (discussing the development and implementation of the
tribal consultation requirement).
61. Who We Are, OFFICE OF TRIBAL REL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=OTR (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
62. U.S. FOREST SERV., NATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE RELATIONS (1997); see also Sacred Sites, U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/tribalrelations/sacredsites.shtml (last modified Dec. 20, 2012).
63. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 8101-8107,
122 Stat. 1651, 1659 (codified throughout the U.S.C.).
2012] 359
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tribes, in accordance with [AIRFA]."6 The provisions authorize the tem-
porary closure from public access of an area of national forest land in
order "to protect the privacy of tribal activities for traditional and cultural
purposes"; allow the provision, free of charge, of trees, portions of trees,
and forest products to tribes "for traditional and cultural purposes"; and
restrict disclosure of culturally sensitive information.6 5
Acting pursuant to AIRFA and post-AIRFA developments such as
those summarized above, federal land managers have developed man-
agement plans for a number of public lands that take into account the
need to protect Indian religious uses at sites located on the lands. These
plans have been developed in consultation with tribes (and other interest-
ed parties) and seek to balance carefully the needs and concerns of dif-
ferent users. In several instances, the management plans and other land
use decisions have been challenged as violations of the Establishment
Clause. The charge that the government is in any sense trying to "estab-
lish" any traditional Indian religion's beliefs and practices as a state reli-
gion seems ironic, to put it mildly, when viewed against the backdrop of
historical government efforts to suppress Indian religious practices and
impose Christianity.66 Four plans designed to take into account Indian
religious exercise needs in connection with sacred sites, and the litigation
brought to challenge them on Establishment Clause grounds, are exam-
ined below.
B. Four Case Studies: Developing Management Plans that Respect Reli-
gious Freedom
1. Devils Tower National Monument
Those who use the butte to pray become stronger. They gain sacred
knowledge from the spirits that helps us preserve our Lakota culture
and way of life. They become leaders. Without their knowledge and
leadership, we cannot continue to determine our own destiny.67
64. § 8101(7), 122 Stat. at 2048.
65. § 8104(b), 122 Stat. at 2049-50 (closure); § 8105, 122 Stat. at 2050 (forest products); see
§ 8106(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 2050 (disclosure restriction). The disclosure restriction limits disclosure of
information relating to "resources, cultural items, uses, or activities that . . . have a traditional and
cultural purpose[] and ... are provided ... under an express expectation of confidentiality in the
context of forest and rangeland research activities." § 8106, 122 Stat. at 2050. Another provision
restricts disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of information "concerning the identity,
use, or specific location ... of ... a site or resource used for traditional and cultural purposes by an
Indian tribe." § 8106(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 2050. The provisions also allow for reburial of human re-
mains and cultural items in national forests. § 8103, 122 Stat. at 2049.
66. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
67. Brief for Intervenors in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (No. 99-1045), 2000 WL 34014041, at
* 1-2 [hereinafter Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge].
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In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association v. Babbitt,68 a group of
plaintiffs challenged a Final Climbing Management Plan (FCMP) devel-
oped by the NPS for Wyoming's Devils Tower National Monument.
Devils Tower, a popular rock-climbing site, had been damaged and dis-
figured by recreational climbers, who affixed climbing equipment to the
monument's surface.70 The monument (which was deemed eligible for
inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places) is also a sacred site
for a number of Northern Plains tribes.' In addition to physically damag-
ing the monument, climbers also had taken photographs of Indian reli-
gious practitioners participating in ceremonies and removed sacred pray-
er bundles.72
Members of various tribes each refer to Devils Tower by different
names "Bear's Lodge" (Cheyenne and Lakota), "Bear's Tipi" (Arapaho),
"Bear's House" (Crow), and "Tree Rock" (Kiowa). 73 Each tribe associat-
ed with the tower "considers it to be an area of great importance in tribal
heritage, culture, and spirituality."74 Historically it was, and is now once
again, the site of the Lakota Sun Dance, which the federal government
banned from 1883 until the 1930s.75
The FCMP provided that rock climbers would be asked to, out of
respect, "voluntarily refrain from climbing on Devils Tower during the
culturally significant month of June."7  The FCMP also called for the
development of an interpretive education program to explain the reli-
gious and cultural significance of the monument and for the placement of
signs to encourage visitors to remain on the trail around the tower. The
FCMP did not sit well with climbers and commercial guides, several of
whom filed suit in the Wyoming federal district court, claiming that the
FCMP promoted Indian religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
68. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff'd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
69. See id. at 1449-51.
70. Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 67, at 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 3 n.l, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175
F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-8021), 1998 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 57, at *3 n.1 [hereinafter
U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge]. An 1858 map labeled Devils Tower with the Lakota words for Bear's
Lodge, "Mato Tepee." Id. Prior to discussing the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge in its
brief filed in response to the claim, the Government argued that the appellants lacked standing to
challenge the FCMP because they had not suffered any injury as a result of it. See id. at 16-20.
74. Id. at 5; see also Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 67, at 1-5 (discuss-
ing the significance of Devils Tower, the impact of disturbances from climbing, and FCMP provi-
sions to deal with those impacts).
75. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 6 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN OFFICE 106 (1894)).
76. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450 (quoting NAT'L PARK SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, FINAL CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: DEVIL'S
TOWER NATIONAL MONUMENT, CROOK COUNTY, WYOMING, at i (internal quotation mark omitted)).
77. Id at 1451.
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2. Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark
Many diverse Native American tribes and individuals continue to re-
gard the Medicine Mountain complex as one of the most important
sacred sites in the nation .. .. [T]raditional ceremonial practices have
been continuous, despite the suppression of American Indian reli-
- * 78gious expression ... .
In Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service,79 a timber com-
pany raised an Establishment Clause challenge to the USFS's plan for
the management of Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark.so Lo-
cated on Medicine Mountain in Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming,
the Medicine Wheel is a prehistoric circular structure of rocks with a
large cairn in the center and radiating spokes of rocks. The Wheel and
Medicine Mountain have important historical, cultural, and religious
significance for a number of tribes. Archaeologists have concluded that
people have lived in the area for at least 7,500 years. Tepee rings, trails,
and other archaeological features and artifacts found near the Wheel at-
test to the longstanding human habitation of the area.
Federal protection of the Medicine Wheel dates to 1957, when an
approximately 200-acre area in Bighorn National Forest was withdrawn
from mining and virtually all other forms of claims "for the protection
and preservation of the archaeological values of the Medicine Wheel and
adjacent historic area." 82 A 110-acre area, including the Medicine Wheel,
was designated as a National Historic Landmark in 1969. Thus the
original impetus for protecting the Medicine Wheel was concern over its
archaeological and historic (rather than religious) values. Concern over
these values, along with visitor safety concerns, also prompted the devel-
opment of the Historic Preservation Plan for the Medicine Wheel Na-
tional Historic Landmark and Medicine Mountain (the HPP). Increased
use of the landmark had resulted in the displacement, destruction, and
removal of prehistoric features and artifacts. The HPP was developed via
a lengthy process that included consultation with, among other interested
parties, the Wyoming state historic preservation officer and two intertrib-
al organizations (the Medicine Wheel Coalition for Sacred Sites and the
Medicine Wheel Alliance).84
78. NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OMB No. 1024-0018, NATIONAL
HISTORICAL LANDMARK NOMINATION MEDICINE WHEELIMEDICINE MOUNTAIN 19 (2010).
79. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001), aff'd, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004).
80. See id. at 1292.
81. Id at 1286.
82. Id (quoting 22 C.F.R § 4135 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. Id
84. See id at 1286-87. The Big Horn County commissioner and the Federal Aviation Com-




Signed in 1996, the same year in which the Sacred Sites Order was
issued,8 the HPP sought to "ensure that the Medicine Wheel and Medi-
cine Mountain are managed in a manner that protects the integrity of the
site as a sacred site and a nationally important traditional cultural proper-
ty"86 The HPP established a process to integrate "the preservation and
traditional uses of historic properties" with other uses, with priority given
to "the protection of the historic properties involved by continuing tradi-
tional cultural use[s]," 87 and provided for an operating plan that included
use of on-site interpreters, limitations on motorized access, and protec-
tion of traditional cultural uses.88 The USFS implemented the HPP by
issuing an amendment (Amendment 12) to the Bighorn National Forest
Plan. 9
Wyoming Sawmills (Sawmills), a commercial timber company that
had long been the primary purchaser of timber from the forest, 90 chal-
lenged the USFS's approval .of the HPP and issuance of Amendment
12.91 In a suit filed in Wyoming federal district court, Sawmills alleged
that the USFS had impermissibly promoted religion because Indian reli-
gious concerns were a motivating factor behind the decision to adopt the
HPP. Sawmills further alleged that the HPP impermissibly caused the
closure of roads that had previously been usable for commercial logging
operations and required the expenditure of tax dollars on educating visi-
tors about Indian religion. 92
3. Rainbow Bridge National Monument
Neighboring Indian tribes believe Rainbow Bridge is a sacred reli-
gious site. They travel to Rainbow Bridge to pray and make offerings
near and under its lofty span. Special prayers are said before passing
[under] the Bridge .... In respect of these long-standing beliefs, we
request your voluntary cooperation in not approaching or walking
under Rainbow Bridge. 93
85. Id. at 1287; Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (1996).
86. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Brief for Appellants Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. at 9, Wyo. Sawmills, 383 F.3d 1241 (2004) (No. 02-
8009), 2002 WL 33005127, at *9) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. In addition to the
NHPA and AIRFA, the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) and a number of other
statutes govern the USFS's management of the area. See id at 1287-88. ARPA mandates the estab-
lishment of programs to increase awareness of the significance of, and the need to protect, archaeo-
logical resources on public and Indian lands. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(c) (2006). ARPA requires
agencies making relevant rules to take AIRFA into consideration. § 470ii(a).
88. Wyo. Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
89. Wyo. Sawmills, 383 F.3d at 1244.
90. Id. at 1245.
91. Wyo. Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. Sawmills also challenged a USFS decision to
withdraw a timber sale that the USFS had proposed for an area within the HPP's coverage area. Id.
92. Id at 1292.
93. Brief of Appellees at 11-12 n.3, Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 F. App'x 711
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4099), 2003 WL 24031937, at *11-12 n.3 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Natural
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In Natural Arch & Bridge Society v. Alston,94 Earl DeWaal and four
other individuals, along with the Natural Arch and Bridge Society (an
organization of natural arch enthusiasts), challenged the NPS's manage-
ment plan for Rainbow Bridge National Monument. 95 The largest natural
bridge in the world, Rainbow Bridge has religious and historical signifi-
cance for the Hopi, Navajo, San Juan Paiute, and other tribes. First pro-
tected under federal law by a 1910 presidential proclamation, which set
aside the bridge and a 160-acre tract of land as a national monument,
Rainbow Bridge National Monument received a major increase in visi-
tors when the adjoining Lake Powell and Glen Canyon National Recrea-
tion Area were created as part of a federal dam project. The project was
completed following an unsuccessful Free Exercise Clause challenge in
Badoni v. Higginson.96
By the late 1980s, the monument had suffered serious damage, such
as soil erosion, vegetation damage, and damage to archaeological sites
and petroglyphs caused by visitors who touched and climbed on them
and defaced them with graffiti. For members of area tribes such as the
Navajo Nation, who regard Tsi-Na-Ne-Ah (arch rock or rock bridge) as a
sacred place that should be respected and kept in as much of a natural
setting as possible, this amounted to desecration. 97
Recognizing the need for action to protect the monument, the NPS
developed the 1993 General Management Plan for Rainbow Bridge Na-
tional Monument (the Rainbow Bridge GMP), after decades of study and
consideration of public comments. Designed to protect both the natural
and cultural resources of the monument, the Rainbow Bridge GMP con-
templated discouraging (but not prohibiting) visitor access to the base of
the bridge and the area directly underneath it. A sign explained the spir-
itual significance of the site for Indians and requested that visitors not
walk under the bridge out of respect for this perspective. An interpretive
prospectus sought to 'help visitors understand that different cultures
perceive resources differently, i.e., some neighboring American Indians
regard Rainbow Bridge as sacred,' and 'generate visitor interest in the
cultures and lifestyles, from prehistoric to present times, of the people of
the Rainbow Bridge region."' 98
The plaintiffs sued in federal district court in Utah, claiming that the
Rainbow Bridge GMP violated the Establishment Clause. They argued
Arch] (quoting Rainbow Bridge National Monument, NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/rabr/index.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002), af'd, 98 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2004).
95. See id. at 1216-19.
96. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), af'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
97. See Natural Arch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1210, 1213.
98. Id. at 1214. See generally DAVID KENT SPROUL, A BRIDGE BETWEEN CULTURES: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF RAINBOW BRIDGE NATIONAL MONUMENT passim (2003) (describing
in detail the history of the management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument).
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that it coerced them into practicing the Indian religion associated with
the belief about not walking under Rainbow Bridge.99
4. Cave Rock
Lake Tahoe is the place of origin of the Washoe people and .. . the
waters of Lake Tahoe, which are sacred, breathe life into the land,
plants, fish, birds, animals and people around it... .De'ek wadapush,
or "standing gray rock," now known as Cave Rock . . . is a place that
demands the highest respect. 00
In Access Fund v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,lo' the Access
Fund, a climbing advocacy group supported by rock climbers and the
recreation industry, challenged the USFS's decision to ban rock climbing
at Cave Rock, a natural rock formation located partially within a national
forest on the eastern shore of Lake Tahoe.102 Cave Rock is a sacred site
for the Washoe people and "a symbol of their cultural and religious iden-
tity.',103 Whereas Washoe religious practitioners have been coming to
Cave Rock for over 1,000 years when they feel called to seek power or
knowledge there, non-Indians have been going there since the 1980s for
rock climbing. These visitors drilled permanent bolts into Cave Rock to
aid them in their climbing, expanded climbing routes, and added a ma-
sonry floor inside the cave, all without USFS permission.
After Cave Rock was determined to be eligible for inclusion in the
National Register of Historic Places as a TCP and archaeological site, the
USFS developed a plan to protect Cave Rock and "regulate uses there in
a manner that . . . preserves the historic and cultural characteristics that
make the property eligible for listing on the National Register."'o The
USFS decided to ban climbing at Cave Rock and to remove the rock
climbing hardware because of the adverse effects on Cave Rock's herit-
age resources. According to the environmental impact statement underly-
ing the decision, the climbing ban was imposed because of these effects,
not as a way of "requiring others to conform their conduct to Indian cul-
tural concerns."' 06 The USFS also decided, however, to allow hiking,
fishing, and sightseeing at Cave Rock despite Washoe objections to such
activities at a site that the USFS acknowledged was a "core element in
99. See Natural Arch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
100. A. BRIAN WALLACE, WASHOE TRIBE OF NEV. & CAL., PROTECTION OF DE'EK WADAPUSH
(CAVE ROCK): FEDERAL MANAGEMENT AND LITIGATION UPDATE, http://www.yachaywasi-
ngo.org/SC24USAwashoe.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
101. 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).
102. Id. at 1039.
103. Id
104. Id. at 1040.
105. Id. at 1040-41 (alteration in original) (quoting Cave Rock Management Direction, 64 Fed.
Reg. 3678 (proposed Jan. 25, 1999)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
106. Id. at 1041 (quoting Cave Rock Management Direction, 64 Fed. Reg. 3678 (proposed Jan.
25, 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Washoe culture."1 0 7 The Access Fund challenged the climbing ban in
Nevada federal district court, arguing that it violated the Establishment
Clause.
C. Defending Management Decisions Against Establishment Clause
Challenges
The Establishment Clause challenges to the federal land managers'
decisions described above required Government attorneys to come to the
defense of these decisions. Explored below are the arguments made in
the litigation challenging the decisions, which evidence understanding of
the importance of what is at stake for Indians at sacred sites and of the
responsibility of federal land managers to take account of the United
States' political and trust relationship with tribes.
1. Satisfying the Lemon Test
In defending land managers' decisions against claims that they vig-
lated the Establishment Clause, the Government's arguments were (nec-
essarily) shaped by the prevailing legal test, set out by the Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 08 Under the Lemon test, a governmental
action does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular
purpose, (2) does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.'09 Consequently, the Government's first line of defense
was to distance the challenged decisions from efforts to protect religious
exercise by emphasizing motivations that were unrelated to religion, fol-
lowed by arguments that the decisions did not result in legally impermis-
sible effects or excessively entangle the agency in question with religious
institutions, authorities, or activities.
a. Identifying Secular Purposes for Management Decisions
In Bear Lodge, while defending the Devils Tower National Monu-
ment FCMP, the Government cited managing the site in "an orderly fash-
ion," accommodating both recreational and religious users,"o as a per-
missible secular goal of the FCMP. Similarly, the Government explained
in the Wyoming Sawmills litigation that the USFS's Medicine Wheel
107. Id. (quoting Cave Rock Management Direction, 64 Fed. Reg. 3678 (proposed Jan. 25,
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
109. Id. at 612-13.Although some Supreme Court Justices have criticized or even rejected the
Lemon test, it continues to play a central role in Establishment Clause litigation. See Nathan P.
Heller, Context Is King: A Perception-Based Test for Evaluating Government Displays of the Ten
Commandments, 51 VILL. L. REV. 379, 388-89 (2006).
110. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 25. This would "give [the] group[s] ... the type
of access they need to achieve their purposes." 14. at 26. The Government also argued, prior to
discussing the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge in its brief, that the appellants lacked
standing to challenge the FCMP because they had not suffered any injury as a result of it. See id. at
16-20.
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National Historic Landmark HPP serves the secular purpose of
"manag[ing] federal land in an orderly fashion that protects the area's
cultural and archaeological properties.""' In Natural Arch, the Govern-
ment explained that the Rainbow Bridge GMP serves the secular purpose
of preserving the monument's natural and historical value." 2 Much of
the text of the Government's brief on appeal in Natural Arch matches
word for word with the text of its Wyoming Sawmills brief, reflecting the
fact that the briefs were submitted only a few months apart. 113
Elaborating on the "secular purpose" prong in Access Fund, the
Government noted the Supreme Court's statement in McCreary County
v. American Civil Liberties Union 114 that the Lemon test's first prong
asks whether the government took the challenged action for "the predom-
inant purpose of advancing religion"'15 and described the secular interest
in protecting "historically and culturally significant sites."" The rock-
climbing ban was adopted for the secular purpose of preserving the char-
acter and integrity of, and preventing harm to, Cave Rock, which clearly
has cultural, historical, and archaeological significance." Just as with
churches of historical significance that are administered by the NPS, the
fact that Cave Rock's significance is based in part on its use for religious
purposes does not preclude it from federal protection." 8 Additionally, the
government's "compelling secular interest in managing its land in a
manner that avoids interference with private citizens' religious practices"
supports accommodating religious practices, such as Washoe religious
uses of Cave Rock.'19 In countering the Access Fund's contention that
the USFS cannot have a secular interest in protecting a Washoe sacred
site, the Government noted the Ninth Circuit's recent rejection of this
111. Brief of Federal Appellees at 37, Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-8009), 2002 WL 33005129, at *37 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Wyoming
Sawmills]. The Government first argued that Sawmills lacked standing to pursue the Establishment
Clause claim. Id. at 31-32.
112. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 33. The Government noted how the Rainbow
Bridge GMP sought to protect vegetation by funneling visitors onto trails and sought to increase
visitors' appreciation by educating them about the historical and cultural context. Id The Govern-
ment also argued that DeWaal and the other plaintiffs lacked standing. Id at 17.
113. The Wyoming Sawmills brief is dated October 25, 2002, whereas the Natural Arch brief is
dated January 17, 2003. One U.S. Department of Justice attorney (David C. Shilton) is named in
both briefs. See U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at Caption; U.S. Brief, Natural
Arch, supra note 93.
114. 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005).
115. Brief for Appellees at 25, Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 05-15585), 2005 WL 3517404, at *25 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Access Fund] (quoting
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id Under McCreary County, the first prong is satisfied "except in those unusual cases
where the claim [of a secular purpose] was an apparent sham, or the secular purpose secondary." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 865 (2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In McCreary County, the Supreme Court concluded that a Ten Commandments display in
the McCreary County, Kentucky courthouse violated the Establishment Clause. 545 U.S. at 881.
117. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 25-26.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 28-29.
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argument. In Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,12 0 the court upheld an
Arizona policy against purchasing aggregate materials that were mined
from sacred Woodruff Butte, holding that "the desire to 'carry[] out state
construction projects in a manner that does not harm a site of religious,
historical, and cultural importance to several Native American groups
and the nation' is a legitimate secular purpose."l21
b. Emphasizing Management Decisions' Permissible Effects
Addressing the Lemon test's "secular effect" prong, the Government
argued in Bear Lodge that any incidental advancement of religion at
Devils Tower was not a "forbidden effect"-the FCMP is simply allow-
ing "American Indians to advance their religions" (rather than the gov-
ernment advancing religion). 122 Responding to the plaintiffs' argument
that the FCMP coerced park visitors into participating in a religious ex-
ercise, the Government noted that no one is prohibited from climbing in
June. Moreover, even if the FCMP coerced climbers to decide not to
climb, this would not be a compelled religious act, but rather simply a
decision to respect Indian religious practices.1 2 3 The Government argued
in the Wyoming Sawmills litigation that consistent with the HPP's per-
missible secular purposes, the HPP had the permissible primary effects
of reasonably managing the landmark "by balancing the competing de-
mands placed on it" and of accommodating Indians' religious needs.124 It
did not have an impermissible coercive effect because it was merely en-
couraging people to respect religious sensibilities rather than forcing
them to participate in a religious exercise.125
In Natural Arch, the Government noted that the Rainbow Bridge
GMP had the permissible primary effects of reasonably managing the
monument to balance competing demands and of accommodating reli-
gious needs.126 By simply encouraging respect for religious sensibilities,
it did not have an impermissible coercive effect.127 Moreover, the Gov-
120. 382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004).
121. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 28 (alteration in original) (quoting Cholla
Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004)). Woodruff Butte is religiously signifi-
cant to the Hopi Tribe, the Zuni Pueblo, and the Navajo Nation. Id Cholla Ready Mix challenged
Arizona's denial of a permit to sell materials mined at the butte to state construction projects because
of its status as an important cultural, historic, and religious site. Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 972.
122. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 32.
123. Id. at 32-33. The Government distinguished cases like Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594
(1992) (challenging prayers at high school graduation ceremonies), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 61 (1985) (challenging school prayer), in which the Supreme Court found that students "had no
choice but to engage in a religious practice." U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 33. Under the
FCMP, any coercion would be "compulsion to forego secular activities," which these cases do not
suggest violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 34 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 594; Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 61).
124. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 17.
125. Id. at 40; see also id. at 48 50 (considering coercion under the endorsement test and
distinguishing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310-13 (2000)).
126. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 40.
127. Id. at 40-41 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 587).
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ernment noted that courts have upheld a wide variety of government ac-
tions that have allowed religious worship on public property, even where
these actions have involved the exclusion of other uses.12 8 Analogizing to
cases upholding military chaplaincy programs, the Government noted
that in the case of both military bases and sites like Rainbow Bridge,
religious practitioners "would be unable to engage in their religious ac-
tivity unless the government affirmatively accommodated that activi-
,,129
c. Demonstrating Limited Government-Religion Interaction
Finally, the Government argued in each of these cases that its deci-
sions did not run afoul of the Lemon test's "excessive entanglement"
prong. In Bear Lodge, the Government argued that the FCMP does not
result in excessive entanglement between government and religion be-
cause of the very limited involvement of the government with religious
practices. The FCMP does not, for example, require NPS monitoring of
ceremonies' nature or content.' 30 In Wyoming Sawmills, the Government
noted that the excessive entanglement prong requires examination of "the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority"' 3' and explained that the HPP
assures that the area around the landmark "retains an atmosphere condu-
cive to worship by individual Native American religious practitioners"
rather than benefiting religious institutions. 3 2 Moreover, the aid provided
is "neutral and nonideological,"l 3 3 and the USFS has no role in determin-
ing the "nature, content or manner of worship" at the site.' 3 4 Finally, the
involvement of the Medicine Wheel Coalition and the Medicine Wheel
Alliance, which "represent Native American interests, [but are] not ex-
clusively religious organizations," in consultation pursuant to the HPP
does not constitute excessive entanglement. 135
The Government explained in Natural Arch that the Rainbow
Bridge GMP passes muster under the excessive entanglement prong be-
cause, rather than reaching out to aid religious institutions, the govern-
ment was involved in Indian religious practices only in a very limited,
unavoidable way: "Because the United States acquired lands containing
Indian religious sites, it necessarily must make decisions regarding how
128. Id. at 43.
129. Id. at 44.
130. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 37.
131. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 46 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 615 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 47.
133. Id (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134. Id
135. Id. at 45.
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to manage those areas in a way that complies with various laws that re-
quire the government to be sensitive to American Indian religious prac-
tices."
In Access Fund as well, the Government argued that the Cave Rock
climbing ban did not foster excessive entanglement because there was in
fact no entanglement. The USFS was not participating in ceremonies or
in the administration of Washoe religious institutions, nor monitoring
religious practice, but merely enforcing "neutral restrictions on harmful
activities, while permitting access ... for permissible uses by both
Washoe and non-Washoe people."' 3 7
2. Responding to the Endorsement Test
The Government also defended land managers' decisions under the
requirements of another test for evaluating government actions that are
alleged to violate the Establishment Clause, the endorsement test. De-
rived from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,'3 8 the
endorsement test analyzes whether a "reasonable observer," aware of the
history and context in which a government action occurs, would view the
action as an endorsement of religion.' 39 In defending the adoption of the
Devils Tower FCMP under the endorsement test in Bear Lodge, the
Government argued that a reasonable observer would perceive that the
FCMP's goals are constitutionally permissible ones, such as "manag[ing]
federal land in an orderly fashion [and] balanc[ing] the competing de-
mands placed on the use of the site," rather than endorsing Indian reli-
gion.14 0 Responding to the challenge to the Medicine Wheel HPP in Wy-
oming Sawmills, the Government asserted that a reasonable observer,
aware of the history and context underlying the HPP, would recognize
that its goals include managing federal land in an orderly fashion and
balancing competing demands on the use of the monument, not advanc-
ing or endorsing Native American religion.141 The observer would under-
stand that the government only sought "to allow Native Americans cer-
tain opportunities to practice their religions with minimal disturbances
from other visitors and other uses." 4 2
136. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 45.
137. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 39. The Government argued, in conclusion,
that the USFS's "decision to protect the cultural, physical, and historic integrity of Cave Rock by
restricting rock climbing easily satisfies all three prongs" of the Lemon test. Id. at 25.
138. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. Id at 687-94.
140. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 39; see also id. at 37-39.
141. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 49 (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,




3. Acknowledging the Nature of Indian Religions and the Impact of
History
The efforts to counter Establishment Clause challenges that are de-
scribed above rely on arguments similar to those made in cases challeng-
ing actions alleged to improperly advance other religions. They focus on
non-religious goals, and effects, such as management of a site for multi-
ple uses.
Other arguments made in the sacred sites cases, however, drew on
the unique needs and experiences of Indian religious practitioners, while
also treating protection of Indian religions as in keeping with the protec-
tion of mainstream religions-an approach that differed from historical
treatment of Indian religious beliefs and practices as superstitions rather
than "real" religions.143 In defending the Devils Tower FCMP, for exam-
ple, the Government noted that Indians inhabited the Devils Tower area
long before European settlers arrived'" and that each tribe associated
with the tower "considers it to be an area of great importance in tribal
heritage, culture, and spirituality." 14 5 By noting the tribes' longstanding
presence in the Devils Tower area and the revival in the area of the pre-
viously banned Lakota Sun Dance,146 the Government acknowledged the
importance of the site and the past suppression of Indian religious activi-
ties there.
In defending the Cave Rock climbing ban in Access Fund, the Gov-
ernment situated the actions at Cave Rock within the broader landscape
of government protection of other historic and cultural sites. Describing
Cave Rock as "a site of unquestioned value ... as the quintessential
symbol of Washoe Indian culture, religion, and history," the Government
equated banning rock climbing at Cave Rock with similar bans at places
like Mount Rushmore.147 A holding that the government was unable to
ban rock climbing at Cave Rock solely because its significance stemmed
in part from its religious importance would evidence a "hostility towards
religion" that "would bring us into war with our national tradition as em-
bodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of reli-
gion."l48 Moreover, "the presence of Native Americans on this land since
143. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 22, at 789 (discussing nineteenth-century federal officials'
reluctance to recognize ceremonial dances as religious in nature); see also supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text.
144. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 3 n.1.
145. Id. at 5-6; see also Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 67, at 5-6 (dis-
cussing the significance of Devils Tower, the impact of disturbances from climbing, and FCMP
provisions to deal with them).
146. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 6-7 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra
note 75).
147. Id. at 23.
148. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 23 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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time immemorial" renders "properties of traditional cultural and religious
importance to an Indian tribe ... entitled to protection."l 49
4. Mea Culpas for Imposing Burdens on Religious Exercise
Another justification offered by the Government for the challenged
decisions was ameliorating burdens on religious exercise that the Gov-
ernment itself had imposed, a consideration that was woven into the
Government's arguments in several ways. Moreover, the site-specific
nature of Indian religions meant that government imposition of burdens
was potentially even more damaging than would have been the case with
other religions. Thus, in Bear Lodge, the Government identified "remov-
ing a government-created obstacle to the exercise of religion," namely
the authorization of unlimited, noisy, and visible climbing on Devils
Tower,150 as a secular goal of the FCMP. The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that governmental action to alleviate interference with ceremonial
use created by the government itself does not violate the Establishment
Clause.' 5 ' The removal of government-created obstacles to the exercise
of religion is a particularly important goal where Indian religions are
concerned. Because of the sacred nature of a ceremonial site, "Indians
cannot go elsewhere for equivalent religious practices," and their prayers
and ceremonies had been subjected to "great disruption" from recrea-
tional climbers.152 The goal of "remov[ing] government-created obstacles
to the religious use of the site" would also be recognized by a reasonable
observer as a goal of the FCMP.1 3
The Government explained in the Wyoming Sawmills litigation that
the Medicine Wheel HPP serves the secular purpose of "removing a gov-
ernment-created obstacle to the exercise of religion," 54 namely "noise,
disturbance of objects, and other impacts from visitation" that had previ-
ously occurred under the USFS's management of the site and "some-
times had deleterious effects on religious pursuits."'5 5 The Government
referred to the site-specific nature of Indian religions: "[B]ecause the site
149. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
150. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 28.
151. Id at 28-29 (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)). The Government's brief explained the effort to
alleviate the burden on religious exercise:
In order to alleviate the interference with the ceremonial use of Devils Tower caused by
the government's authorization of recreational climbing, NPS adopted a plan that strikes
an appropriate balance between the recreational and ceremonial uses of the monument.
Under that plan, all recreational uses including climbing may be conducted throughout
the year while an educational campaign seeks to inform the public about the ceremonial
uses of the site and to discourage recreational climbing for the month in which the bulk of
those ceremonies take place. That limited governmental action to alleviate the obstacle
that the government itself created does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 30.
152. Id at 29-30.
153. Id at 39.
154. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 40.
155. Id at 41.
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itself is considered sacred, Native Americans cannot go elsewhere for
equivalent religious practices."l 56 The HPP's adoption struck "a permis-
sible balance between ceremonial and nonceremonial uses of the [land-
mark]" and its attempt "to foster visitor respect for and [to] protect tradi-
tional cultural and religious pursuits" and was constitutionally permissi-
ble. 57
In Natural Arch, the Government also cited the removal of "a gov-
ernment-created obstacle to the exercise of religion"'58 as a secular pur-
pose of the Rainbow Bridge GMP. Before the Glen Canyon Dam was
built, Rainbow Bridge "was inaccessible to all but a few tourists, and
thus the conflicts with the needs of Native American religious practition-
ers were minimal." 59 By creating the dam, the government "made Rain-
bow Bridge accessible to thousands of tourists per year, many of whom
had no knowledge of Native American customs and sensibilities." 60 The
disruptions to worship caused by the increase in these visitors "qualify as
burdens on the free exercise of Native American religion," which the
NPS sought to ameliorate by informing visitors of beliefs as to the
bridge's religious significance and asking them to respect these beliefs.' 6 1
These efforts constitute "a measured attempt to alleviate the desecration
which many Native Americans feel when visitors pass under the Bridge,
and thus at least partially lift this burden." 62
Finally, in the Access Fund litigation, the Government acknowl-
edged that it had imposed a burden on Washoe religious exercise by
"taking ownership of Cave Rock and permitting a wide variety of recrea-
tional uses despite the Washoe Tribe's use of the site since time imme-
morial." 6 3 The Government noted the dispossession of the tribe's tradi-
tional territory and its experience with a land-claims process that had not
provided for land recovery' M-a shortcoming of the implementation of
the Indian Claims Commission Act.' 65 The Government went on to em-
156. Id at 40.
157. Id. at 41.
158. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 36.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
162. Id
163. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 29 n.5. This argument was made in response
to the claim by amicus curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation (in support of the Access Fund) that
the government lacks a legitimate interest in accommodating religious practice where the govern-
ment has not itself burdened religious exercise. In the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, the
Government's attorney explained that because the "government owns this property, the government
has exclusive direction and authority to decide who get[s] to use the property. And so it is the gov-
ernment['s] action in allowing or not allowing rock climbing to take place that is going to be posed .
in the burden here." Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499
F.3d 1036 (2007) (No. 05-15585) (statement of Sharon Swingle).
164. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 29 n.5.
165. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 269 (6th
ed. 2011) (noting the focus of the Indian Claims Commission on monetary awards, even though the
Indian Claims Commission Act did not explicitly limit recovery in successful land claims to mone-
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phasize that its interest in accommodating religious practice is not lim-
ited to situations in which the Government itself had imposed a burden
on religious exercise.16 6
5. Acknowledging Obligations Arising from the Political and Trust
Relationships
In addition to acknowledging the responsibilities imposed on the
United States because of the deleterious impact of past policies on Indian
religious exercise, the Government also cited obligations stemming from
the unique relationship between tribes and the United States. In Bear
Lodge, for example, in identifying the secular goals of the Devils Tower
FCMP, the Government noted that the FCMP "serves the secular goal of
effectuating the federal government's political relationship with Ameri-
can Indians." Accommodations of Indian religious practices that help
to effectuate this relationship "are particularly appropriate" and have
been held to "satisfy the Establishment Clause based only on a showing
that the accommodation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.""'6 In addition, "[f]ulfillment of the federal govern-
ment's trust responsibility toward American Indian tribes . . . constitutes
a secular purpose .. . with the secular effect of promoting tribal sover-
eignty.",6 Analyzing the FCMP under the Lemon test's secular effect
prong, the Government explained that the FCMP is "effectuating the
federal government's political relationship with American Indians." 70
This relationship also figured in the analysis under the endorsement test:
a reasonable observer would perceive "effectuat[ing] the political rela-
tionship between the federal government and American Indian tribes" as
one of the FCMP's constitutionally permissible goals.171
In the Wyoming Sawmills litigation, the Government explained that
the Medicine Wheel HPP served the secular purpose of "effectuating the
federal government's political relationship with American Indians," as
recognized by the Sacred Sites Order and AIRFA.172 Courts have recog-
nized that religious accommodations that effectuate this relationship are
"particularly appropriate and satisfy the Establishment Clause based only
on a showing that the accommodation bears a rational relationship to a
tary damages, and the fact that just compensation would have required the return of at least some of
the taken land).
166. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 29 n.5 (citing Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d
765, 766 n.15 (9th Cir. 1991)).
167. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 23.
168. Id. at 24 (citing Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1992);
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991)).
169. Id at 25.
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id. at 33.
172. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 38. The brief also cited the Program-
matic Agreement that preceded adoption of the HPP for its recognition of the government's trust
relationship with tribes. Id
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legitimate government interest." 73 The rational relationship standard for
evaluating accommodations for Indians "derives from what the Supreme
Court has characterized as the 'peculiar semisovereign and constitution-
ally recognized status of Indians,' which 'justifies special treatment on
their behalf when rationally related to the Government's unique obliga-
tion toward the Indians."'"
74
"[E]ffectuat[ing] the government's trust responsibility and political
relationships with Tribes" was identified as one of the secular purposes
served by the Rainbow Bridge GMP in the Natural Arch litigation. 75 In
the Access Fund litigation as well, the Government referred to its "con-
stitutional role as protector of Native Americans."l 76 Its secular interest
in accommodating religious and cultural uses "is particularly acute with
respect to Native Americans, with whom the government has a unique
legal and historical relationship."77 Referring to the constitutional un-
derpinnings of the political relationship between tribes and the United
States, the Government noted that "[o]ur Constitution gives the federal
government significant latitude to act for the benefit of federally recog-
nized Indian tribes," as recognized by the Supreme Court in Morton v.
Mancari.178 The USFS's effort to protect the ability of a federally recog-
nized tribe-in other words, a tribe with a political, government-to-
government relationship with the United States-to use Cave Rock for
traditional purposes "was consistent with federal law requiring federal
agencies to attempt to protect Indian sacred sites and to accommodate
access to and ceremonial use of the sites by Indian religious practition-
ers."'7 9 Courts of appeals' decisions consequently have recognized that
"the Establishment Clause permits the government to take special steps
to accommodate Indian tribes' cultural and religious traditions."' 80
173. Id. at 38-39 (citing Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34-35 (1st Cir.
1992); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991)).
174. Id. at 39 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979)).
175. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 34 ("Actions which accommodate tribal cul-
ture, including religious practices, effectuate the government's trust responsibility and political
relationships with Tribes.").
176. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 21. The Government cited, in addition to
Lemon and Lynch, a number of Supreme Court cases in support of its position, including Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005), and Corp. of Presiding Bishops of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987). Id. at 23-25, 32.
177. Id at 30 (emphasis added).
178. Id (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 & n.24 (1974)).
179. Id. (emphasis added). The Government's brief cited the Sacred Sites Order and AIRFA in
support of this statement. Id. at 30-31 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24,
1996); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)).
180. Id. at 31. The Government's brief referred to Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildhfe Serv., 957
F.2d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1992), which rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal law
prohibiting possession of eagle feathers, except for Indian tribes' religious use, and Peyote Way
Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991), which rejected an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to a ban on peyote use except by Native American religious organiza-
tions. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 31-32; see also id. at 20-21 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§
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6. Responding to Lyng and Other Indian Free Exercise Clause
Precedents
In defending against the Establishment Clause challenges, the Gov-
ernment also addressed Free Exercise Clause cases involving Indian reli-
gious practitioners, such as Lyng and Badoni. Lyng was cited for its en-
couragement of religious exercise accommodation and distinguished as
to its holding on the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim. In Bear
Lodge, for example, the Government noted that the Supreme Court em-
phasized in Lyng that accommodation of Indian religious practices is
constitutionally permissible."' Similarly, the Government argued in Wy-
oming Sawmills that the "HPP represents precisely the kind of accom-
modation encouraged by the Court in Lyng."l 82 The Government's briefs
in Natural Arch and Access Fund also noted Lyng's support for accom-
modation of tribal religious traditions.'83 The Government noted further
in Natural Arch that given the similarity between the NPS policies at the
monument and NPS free exercise accommodation at many other sites,
accepting the theory that the policies violated the Establishment Clause
would cast "a large shadow ... on the many similar efforts by the Park
Service and other agencies to accommodate religious practices on public
lands."' 84
Addressing the argument that Lyng's rejection of the plaintiffs' Free
Exercise Clause claim rendered the challenged land management deci-
sion illegitimate, the Government argued in Wyoming Sawmills that this
aspect of Lyng is "readily distinguishable."' 85 Lyng addressed the issue of
what the Free Exercise Clause requires of the government, while making
clear that the government "has a range of discretion to accommodate
religious practices."'8 6
The Government also responded to arguments based on Badoni, in
which the Tenth Circuit rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to the
Government's management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument.' 8 7
The Government noted in Bear Lodge that there was no conflict between
the adoption of the Devils Tower FCMP, in which the NPS chose to al-
low Indians to use Devils Tower for ceremonial purposes, and the court's
470(b)(2), 470a(6)(A) (2006)) (noting that federal law recognizes the government's interests in
preserving sites of religious importance to Native Americans, which are part of the historical and
cultural foundations of the United States).
181. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 34.
182. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 52.
183. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 37-38; U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note
115, at *32.
184. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 31.
185. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 50. Lyng, along with Badoni v. Hig-
ginson, 638 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1980), were "[tihe principal cases relied on by Sawmills." U.S.
Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note Ill , at 50.
186. Id. at 52.
187. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
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decision in Badoni, which held that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require that the government exclude recreational visitors from Rainbow
Bridge National Monument to facilitate Indian ceremonial use.' 88 More-
over, although dicta in Badoni suggested that accommodations that ex-
cluded the public from "its normal use of the area" would violate the
Establishment Clause, the FCMP did not implicate the dicta because it
did not exclude the public from climbing. Also, in an interesting com-
ment on the proper characterization of uses of Devils Tower, the Gov-
ernment noted that "it would make no sense to characterize climbing
rather than American Indian ceremonies as the 'normal use' of the site,
as the ceremonial use of Devils Tower long predate[s] recreational rock
climbing on the site."'"9 Finally, the Government expressed disagreement
with the Badoni dicta, explaining that "the government routinely ex-
cludes the general public from public lands in order to allow religious
practices to occur, and such actions have never been held to violate the
Establishment Clause." 90 Examples of such a practice include chapels in
military institutions and airports, religious funerals in Arlington National
Cemetery, and the issuance of a permit for a Papal Mass on the National
Mall.'91
In Wyoming Sawmills, the Government dismissed Badoni as being
(like Lyng) "readily distinguishable."' 9 2 The dicta in Badoni indicating
that exclusion of tourists would violate the Establishment. Clause hypoth-
esized conditions that differ greatly from the management of the Medi-
cine Wheel pursuant to the HPP, which does not exclude the public and
is aimed primarily at protecting the landmark's cultural and archaeologi-
cal resources.193
The Access Fund also relied on dicta in Bear Lodge, Natural Arch,
and Badoni as support for its argument that the Cave Rock climbing ban
had the primary effect of endorsing religion. The Government distin-
guished these cases as each involving a different factual scenario than
was present in the Access Fund litigation and thus not undercutting the
argument that the climbing ban satisfied the Lemon test's "primary ef-
fect"' prong.1
7. Summary of the Government's Arguments
In the cases discussed above, the Government provided detailed de-
fenses of federal land managers' decisions utilizing the kinds of argu-
188. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 35 (citing Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179).
189. Id. at 36 n.12.
190. Id at 36; see also id at 38 ("Badoni is incorrect in suggesting that the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from designating public spaces for exclusively religious us-
es . . . .").
191. Id. at 36-37.
192. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 50.
193. Id. at 51.
194. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 36-38.
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ments and relying on the precedents that would commonly be used to
defend religious accommodations in Establishment Clause challenges,
indicating a conviction that Indian religious exercise rights fit within the
mainstream of religious freedom protection. At the same time, the inclu-
sion of arguments that draw on Indian law principles and precedents in-
dicates recognition that addressing Indian religious needs requires in-
formed, deliberate solicitousness on the part of the government and that
this treatment is firmly grounded in longstanding legal principles. Past
suppression of religious practices, taking of aboriginal lands, and other
actions that have burdened religious exercise necessitate protective ac-
tions to ameliorate these burdens, which interfere with ceremonial use-
a normal use of public land. Indeed, even an exclusion of the public from
a site to allow ceremonies to occur is defensible.
The United States' political relationship with, and trust responsibil-
ity toward, tribes was acknowledged as a permissible-and in fact cru-
cial-factor in shaping plans to manage public lands on which sacred
sites are located. The dilemma faced by Indian religious practitioners
was recognized: the site-specific nature of their religions means that they
cannot simply go elsewhere to conduct ceremonies and other activities,
but they face disruptions from other visitors if they continue their prac-
tices at sites on public lands. Plans that are devised to respect and protect
these practices do not violate the Establishment Clause. In short, the
Government's efforts to defend the management plans developed at the
four sites at issue in these cases suggest a rejection of past hostile and
discriminatory policies toward Indian religions and a firm commitment
to fulfill the obligation to protect the religious needs of their contempo-
rary practitioners.
D. The Judicial Response: Establishment Clause Challenges Rejected
In the Bear Lodge litigation, the district court rejected the Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the request that visitors refrain from climb-
ing on Devils Tower during June. The court agreed with the Government
that the voluntary climbing "ban" had a secular purpose (removing barri-
ers to worship resulting from public ownership of the tower), did not
have the impermissible effect of coercing participation in religion, and
did not constitute excessive entanglement between the government and
religion.195 The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit,
which drew on briefs submitted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
which had intervened in the litigation, and by amici curiae to discuss the
significance of Devils Tower in its 1999 opinion. The court of appeals
reviewed past government policy toward Indians, including support for
missionaries and violent actions to suppress religious ceremonies, such
195. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1455-56 (D. Wyo. 1998).
The court did not address the challenges to the interpretive program or the placement of signs be-
cause it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue these claims. Id. at 1453.
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as the 1890 Ghost Dance Massacre at Wounded Knee. The court noted
the results of the change in this policy, embodied in developments such
as AIRFA, the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act (NAGPRA), the 1992 amendments to the National Historical
Preservation Act, and the Sacred Sites Order.' 96
After this extensive discussion of past suppression-and more re-
cent protection-of Indian religious exercise, however, the court of ap-
peals declined to address the merits of the Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to the Devils Tower FCMP. The plaintiffs (who had continued to
climb at the site despite the voluntary climbing limit) had not suffered
any injury and therefore lacked standing to pursue their claim, the court
explained.19 7 Although the climbers were, the court noted, "clearly in-
censed by the NPS'[s] request that they voluntarily limit their climbing,"
their indignation was no substitute for showing an actual injury.198 After
the court denied the plaintiffs' request for rehearing en banc,199 they
sought Supreme Court review of the panel's decision, but without suc-
cess.200 The NPS continues to manage Devils Tower National Monument
with a view toward accommodating Indian religious practices, among
other uses of the site, and to enrich visitors' experiences by educating
them about its significance to those who have long worshipped there. 20 1
In Wyoming Sawmills, the district court concluded in 2001 that
Sawmills lacked standing to pursue its Establishment Clause challenge to
the Medicine Wheel HPP2 02 and consequently did not address the merits
196. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817-18 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817-18 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
the historical suppression of Indian religion as a basis for ameliorative measures); Brief by Amici
Curiae Med. Wheel Coal. on Sacred Sites of N. Am. et al. at 9-10, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n
v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-8021), 1998 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 62, at
*9-10. In the 1890 Ghost Dance Massacre, Sioux men, women, and children who had gathered on
the Pine Ridge Reservation were killed in an attack by Seventh Cavalry troops participating in ef-
forts to suppress the Ghost Dance religion. The scattering of the bodies of women and children along
a distance of two miles from their Pine Ridge camp indicated that many had been killed while flee-
ing. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 794-99 (discussing the Ghost Dance and the massacre).
197. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821-22. The court noted that the individual recreational climbers
had been undeterred by the FCMP and that the plaintiff who was a commercial climbing guide had
not established any economic injury. Id. at 821.
198. Id. at 822.
199. Brief for Intervenors in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20 n.24, Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (No. 99-1045), 2000 WL 34014041, at
*20 n.24.
200. Bear Lodge, 529 U.S. at 1037.
201. George L. San Miguel, How Is Devils Tower a Sacred Site to American Indians, NAT'L
PARK SERV. (Aug. 1994), http://www.nps.gov/deto/historyculture/sacredsite.htm.
202. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1292-97 (D. Wyo. 2001).
The court concluded that although Sawmills had suffered an injury in fact resulting from the HPP
because the HPP caused it to lose the opportunity to bid on timber sales, Sawmills' injury would not
be redressed by striking down the HPP because doing so would not guarantee Sawmills the right to
log in the Horse Creek area. Id at 1296-97. The court rejected claims that Sawmills had also suf-
fered an injury on the grounds that it was "directly affected" by the U.S. Forest Service's manage-
ment of Medicine Mountain under the HPP as a sacred site. The court noted that Sawmills relied on
previous cases that had involved individual (rather than corporate) plaintiffs who were offended by
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of the claim, a decision that Sawmills appealed to the Tenth Circuit. In a
2004 opinion, the court of appeals acknowledged the overlap, recognized
in the HPP, of the cultural, historical, and religious aspects of the land-
mark for Indians: "The HPP recognizes explicitly that the cultural and
historic importance of the Medicine Wheel is, for many Native Ameri-
cans, an element of their religious tradition."203 The court noted that the
preservation of the Medicine Wheel is consistent with the USFS's re-
sponsibilities under the Sacred Sites Order and a number of statutes
aimed at protecting archaeological and historical sites and resources.204
Because the court affirmed the holding that Sawmills lacked standing to
pursue its Establishment Clause claim, however, it did not address the
claim's merits. 20 5 The Tenth Circuit denied Sawmills' petition for rehear-
ing en banc,206 a defeat that was followed by the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of Sawmills' petition for writ of certiorari in 2005.207
The landmark was renamed in 2011 as Medicine Wheel/Medicine
Mountain National Historic Landmark and expanded to cover an addi-
tional area of more than 4,000 acres.208 The expanded landmark includes
the summit of Medicine Mountain, the Medicine Wheel, an adjoining
ridge, and other adjacent lands with traditional spiritual and ceremonial
significance.209 Whereas the original landmark designation focused on
the area's archaeological value and encompassed only a 110-acre area
around the Medicine Wheel, the expanded designation recognizes the
Medicine Wheel and Medicine Mountain as having national significance
because of their traditional cultural value to many tribes.210 In short, the
federal government's commitment to the protection of the Medicine
coming in contact with religious symbolism that was being advanced by government action. Id at
1294-95. Finally, the court rejected Sawmills' argument that it suffered a constitutional injury from
the use of tax dollars to further Native American religion, relying on the taxpayer standing analysis
in Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of Church State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982). Id at 1295-96.
203. Wyo. Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
204. Id. (citing the Antiquities Act of 1906, the Historic Sites Act of 1935, the NHPA, the
Archaeological and Historic Resources Protection Act of 1974, AIRFA, and the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979).
205. Id at 1249.
206. The Tenth Circuit denied Sawmills' petition for rehearing en banc in December 2004.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 546 U.S. 811 (2005)
(No. 04-1175), 2005 WL 520493 at *1.
207. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 546 U.S. 811 (2005).
208. America's Great Outdoors: Secretary Salazar Designates 14 New National Historic
Landmarks, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR (June 30, 2011),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/AMERICAS-GREAT-OUTDOORS-Secretary-Salazar-
Designates-I 4-New-National-Historic-Landmarks.cfm.
209. Interior Secretary Salazar Announces Renaming of Medicine Wheel National Historic
Landmark, NATIVE NEWS NETWORK (July 6, 2011), http://www.nativenewsnetwork.com/interior-
secretary-salazar-announces-renaming-of-medicine-wheel-national-historic-landmark.html.
210. Robert J. Miller, Medicine Wheel/Medicine Mountain National Historic Landmark,
NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND




Wheel continues in spite of attacks by those who would place commer-
cial and other interests above religious freedom.
In Natural Arch, the district court applied the Lemon test and con-
cluded in 2002 that the Rainbow Bridge GMP served the dual secular
purposes of promoting visitor understanding of different cultures and
"fostering the preservation of the historical, social, and cultural practices
of Native Americans." 211 It did not have an impermissible effect because
a reasonable observer would not view it as conveying a message of gov-
ernent endorsement of Indian religious beliefs and because requesting
visitors to consider not walking under the bridge does not amount to co-
ercion "into practicing the Native American religion associated with the
belief' about not passing under it.212 Finally, the Rainbow Bridge GMP
did not create excessive entanglement between government and religion.
Not only are the entities (tribes) that benefit from it not primarily reli-
gious in nature and the NPS involvement with religious practices very
limited, but the NPS-tribal consultation about the bridge's cultural, reli-
gious, and social importance was necessary for the NPS "to fulfill its
important trust responsibilities to American Indians." 2 13 The court noted
the requirement in the Sacred Sites Order that federal agencies "accom-
modate access to and ceremonial use" of sites by Indian religious practi-
tioners and "avoid adversely affecting the[ir] physical integrity." 2 14
Plaintiff DeWaal, who blamed the NPS's actions at Rainbow Bridge
on "treehuggers from the Sierra Club" and "Injuns," 215 appealed the dis-
missal of the claim to the Tenth Circuit. Relying on Bear Lodge, the
court of appeals decided that none of the plaintiffs had standing to chal-
lenge the Rainbow Bridge GMP. 2 16 The court noted the similarity to the
Bear Lodge facts: in neither case did the plaintiffs suffer any injury from
being asked to voluntarily refrain from going to a certain area out of re-
spect for Indians' views on its religious significance.217 In 2004, the Su-
preme Court denied DeWaal's petition for writ of certiorari.2 18 The NPS
211. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1224 (D. Utah 2002). The
court concluded that only plaintiff DeWaal had standing to challenge the Rainbow Bridge GMP on
Establishment Clause grounds. Id. at 1216-19.
212. Id. at 1224-25.
213. Id. at 1226; see also id. at 1224-26. The court rejected DeWaal's additional equal protec-
tion claim. Id. at 1220.
214. Id. at 1226 n.11. The court also cited NAGPRA and the 1992 NHPA Amendments as
additional examples of statutes "protecting tribal governments and cultures." Id.
215. Id at 1221 n.9 (quoting Ranger Paul Nelson's incident report concerning Mr. DeWaal)
(internal quotation marks omitted). DeWaal expressed his theory about the "conspiracy" between the
NPS, the Sierra Club, and Indians in an encounter with a park ranger during a visit to the monument.
Id.
216. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 F. App'x 711, 715-716 (10th Cir. 2004). The
Natural Arch opinion predated the Wyoming Sawmills opinion (dated March 23, 2004, and Septem-
ber 20, 2004, respectively).
217. Id. at 716.
218. DeWaal v. Alston, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
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continues to manage the monument in a way that fosters respect for the
religious significance of Rainbow Bridge.2 19
Finally, in the fourth case, the Access Fund litigation, the district
court held in 2005 that the USFS had not violated the Establishment
Clause by imposing a climbing ban at Cave Rock. 22 0 The Access Fund
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. For the first time, a court of
appeals reached the merits of, and rejected, an Establishment Clause
challenge to a federal land management decision that took into account
Indian religious rights. The 2007 Ninth Circuit opinion began with a de-
scription of the religious significance of the site, noting that "many
Washoe compare Cave Rock to a church." 2 2 1 The court held that the
Government "easily satisfie[d]" the first prong of the Lemon test because
the ban "served the permissible secular goal of protecting cultural, histor-
ical and archaeological features of Cave Rock." 22 2 Moreover, even if the
climbing ban had been imposed "in part to mitigate interference with the
Washoe's religious practices, this objective alone would not give rise to a
finding of an impermissible religious motivation" because Cave Rock's
status as a Washoe sacred site "does not diminish its importance as a
national cultural resource."2 23 Nor did the climbing ban have impermissi-
ble effects. As a practical matter, the climbing ban could not be per-
ceived as endorsing Washoe religious practices, given that the USFS had
rejected the tribe's preferred alternative of banning all activities incon-
sistent with Washoe belief.224 Finally, there was no excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion simply because the USFS would
need to have a surveillance program to enforce the climbing ban; super-
visory oversight of recreational activities at the site is no different from
monitoring to ensure that other rules are followed. 2 25 The court also re-
jected the Access Fund's reliance on dicta in Bear Lodge and Natural
219. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, Rainbow Bridge National Monument, Things to Do, NAT'L
PARK SERVICE (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.nps.gov/rabr/planyourvisit/things2do.htm ("We ask that
visitors respect the religious significance of Rainbow Bridge to neighboring tribes and consider
viewing Rainbow Bridge from the viewing area rather than walking up to or under the bridge.").
220. Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
district court relied on Lemon); see also Jeff DeLong, Judge Tells Climbers to Keep off Cave Rock,
RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL (Reno, Nev.), Jan. 31, 2005, at Cl (stating that a federal judge upheld the
climbing ban in a January 28, 2005 ruling).
221. Access Fund, 499 F.3d at 1039 (describing the site's historical and archaeological signifi-
cance).
222. Id at 1043-44.
223. Id at 1044 (citing Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 972, 975-76 (9th Cir.
2004)).
224. Id at 1045 (noting that the preferred alternative "would have denied non-Washoe access
to the TCP and banned hiking and other recreational uses at the rock").
225. Id at 1046. The court noted that recent Supreme Court opinions had discussed the second
and third prongs of the Lemon test together, although some recent Ninth Circuit cases still discussed
entanglement as a separate prong. The court focused its discussion on the first two prongs, "with an
eye to potential effects that might result in government becoming impermissibly embroiled in reli-
gious affairs." Id. at 1043.
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Arch, which it noted are out-of-circuit cases that are factually distin-
guishable.226
Judge Wallace concurred in the Access Fund result but believed that
the climbing ban should be analyzed in accordance with the 2005 plurali-
ty opinion in Van Orden v. Perry,227 in which the Supreme Court found
that a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause.228 Like the religiously
and historically significant Ten Commandments monument, the Cave
Rock climbing ban has a dual significance: "[A]lthough it may promote
the Washoe religion, it also protects a culturally, historically, and ar-
chaeologically significant site." 229 Mere promotion of a message con-
sistent with a religious doctrine does not violate the Establishment
Clause because there is "no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion." 2 30
Following the Access Fund decision, a USFS order was signed to
enforce a permanent climbing closure, and the USFS took action to re-
move the climbing bolts that disfigured Cave Rock. The USFS continues
to implement its management plan for Cave Rock-to prevent climbing
in or on Cave Rock, manage the site for its "historic, cultural, archaeo-
logical and scientific values," and repair the damage done by climbers.231
Access Fund's significance is underscored by a 2011 Montana fed-
eral district court decision. In Fortune v. Thompson,2 32 the court rejected
a claim that the USFS's travel management plan (TMP) for a portion of
the sacred Badger-Two Medicine area (in Lewis and Clark National For-
est) violated the Establishment Clause.233 The TMP created motorized-
use restrictions for most of the area to mitigate interference with Black-
feet religious practices, among other reasons.234 Relying on Access Fund,
the court found that the TMP passed muster under the Lemon test.235
226. Id. at 1046.
227. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
228. Access Fund, 499 F.3d at 1047 (Wallace, J., concurring) (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at
690-91).
229. Id at 1048.
230. Id. (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684) (internal quotation mark omitted).
231. U.S. FOREST SERV., CAVE ROCK MANAGEMENT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2009).
232. No. CV-09-98-GF-SEH, 2011 WL 206164 (D. Mont. Jan. 20, 2011).
233. Id. at *1, *3.
234. Id
235. Id. at *2 3. The court noted that the restriction was adopted for "a host of secular purpos-
es, including benefits to air quality, water quality, soil quality, wildlife habitat, and fish habitat" and
with consideration to "the Traditional Cultural District located within Badger-Two Medicine Area
and to resources governed by the [NHPA], 16 U.S.C. § 470f." Id. Also, the principal effect of the
TMP neither advanced nor inhibited religion and the TMP did not lead to excessive entanglement
with religion. Id. For a discussion of traditional Blackfeet religion and the religious significance of
the Badger-Two Medicine area, see Jay Hansford C. Vest, Traditional Blackfeet Religion and the
Sacred Badger-Two Medicine Wildlands, 6 J. L. & RELIGION. 455, 460-84 (1988).
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Although the outcomes in cases that have rejected Establishment
Clause challenges to the public lands management decisions discussed
above are undoubtedly positive from the perspective of religious freedom
proponents, it should not be assumed that the land management plans
that survived Establishment Clause challenges, either on the merits or on
standing grounds, were sufficient to fully protect religious exercise.
Washoe Tribal Chairman A. Brian Wallace has noted, for example, that
the USFS plan at Cave Rock "permits activities that will continue to ad-
versely affect the Tribe's traditional use." He warned that although some
decisions to protect sacred sites are being made and upheld, there are no
guarantees that sites will be protected. Consequently, "repatriation of a
site to the indigenous people is the only way to ensure proper protec-
tion." He expressed the Washoe Tribe's "hope that the recent protections
to the site demonstrate the strength and resiliency of indigenous cul-
ture."2 36 Chairman Wallace's concerns are borne out by tribal challenges
based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to public lands man-
agement decisions that threaten to interfere with religious exercise, and
by judicial reactions to them, as discussed below.
II. RFRA CHALLENGES TO INADEQUATE SACRED SITES PROTECTION:
THE GOVERNMENT AS FOE
[T]he American court system, composed largely of non-Indian feder-
al judges, has demonstrated over the years an inordinate difficulty in
applying regular principles of the First Amendment to native reli-
gions. . . . [J]udges resist applying the same rules of law that they
routinely apply in any other religion cases. . . . [T]here are cross-
cultural difficulties in understanding . . . why this peyote plant is sa-
cred or why this waterfall or this mountaintop has to be pre-
served.... The courts have had so much difficulty that the U.S. Su-
preme Court ... turned over the chore of protecting Native religious
liberty to the legislative branch. 237
Congress recognized that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with reli-
gious exercise," and legislated "the compelling interest test" as the
means for the courts to "strik[e] sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests." We have no
cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts un-
der RFRA is an easy one ... 238
Examination of the arguments made by the United States in cases in
which it defends its actions against accusations that they violate the Es-
236. WALLACE, supra note 96.
237. Walter Echo-Hawk, Lenny Foster & Alan Parker, Issues in the Implementation of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Panel Discussion, 19 WICAZO SA REv. 153, 156 (2004).
238. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)).
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tablishment Clause may create the impression that the government is a
zealous defender of Indian religious freedom and sacred sites. A different
picture emerges, however, from examining the Government's response to
RFRA claims brought by tribes and individual Indians with regard to
government conduct, and government approval of conduct by third par-
ties, that threatens worship and other religious activities at sacred sites.
Similarly, the above analysis of federal court opinions addressing these
accusations suggests that judges understand what is at stake for those
who worship at sacred sites when these sites are threatened by competing
uses and recognize the need, and the United States' legal responsibility,
to protect these sites. The judicial response to RFRA claims based on
threats to such sites, on the other hand, belies this impression.
A. RFRA: Putting the Government to the Test
RFRA provides that the government may not "substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion" unless it "demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person ... is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest [and] is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest."23 9 Although the Supreme Court held in
1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores,24 0 that RFRA is unconstitutional as
applied to the states, on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's en-
forcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,241 the
decision did not invalidate the statute as applied to the federal govern-
24ment.242 RFRA does not define "substantially burden," but the statute's
legislative findings made it clear that Congress disagreed with the limita-
tions that the Supreme Court had imposed on religious freedom claims in
Smith:
[L]aws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; govern-
ments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification; in Employment Division v. Smith, ... the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the govern-
ment justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion; and the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(l)(a)-(b) (2006).
240. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
241. Id. at 536. In dissent, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court should reexamine its
holding in Smith and "return to a rule that requires government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and to impose that burden only by
means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242. In Gonzales, the Court addressed the merits of a RFRA challenge to federal government
action while noting that "[a]s originally enacted, RFRA applied to the States as well as the Federal
Government," but in City of Boerne v. Flores the Court "held the application to States to be beyond




between religious liberty and competing prior governmental inter-
ests.243
Consequently, Congress sought to restore the application of the compel-
ling interest test to actions that Smith said, following on the heels of Lyng
and Roy, did not need to meet the test. RFRA's purpose clause identified
this goal: "[T]o restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sher-
bert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 244
Although RFRA resulted from Congress's judgment that Smith was
wrongly decided,24 5 the cases discussed below indicate that Congress's
solicitude for Indian religious freedom is not shared by all federal land
managers and federal court judges.
B. Case Studies in Inadequate Protection: Undermining Religious Exer-
cise Rights
1. Desecrating the San Francisco Peaks
From the deepest memories of every Dine person to the core of
their being, from the countless songs of innumerable ceremonies, the
Dine knows this sacred mountain, Dook'o'Osliid, is holy. I ask that
you hear my plea and respond so that the spiritual life of my people
can continue unmolested. 246
247In Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, several tribes came to-
gether to bring a RFRA-based challenge to a USFS decision to allow
snowmaking with treated sewage effluent (referred to by the Government
by the more benign-sounding term "reclaimed waste water") as part of an
expansion project at the privately operated Snowbowl Resort (Snow-
bowl) located on Arizona's San Francisco Peaks. To maximize profits
from the operation of a ski resort in what is, after all, a desert area,
Snowbowl sought a more reliable source of snow, rather than having to
depend on the natural snowfall that could be spotty in dry years. The
sewage effluent that Snowbowl wished to use for this purpose came from
the sewers of Flagstaff and thus contained wastewater not only from
homes but also from morgues, mortuaries, and hospitals. Despite treat-
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)-(5) (2006).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) (citations omitted).
245. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Congress also responded to Smith by enacting
legislation aimed at protecting Indian religious use of peyote. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006).
246. Plaintiffs Navajo Nation et al. Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on "RFRA" Claim at 9, Navajo Nation v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (No. CV 05-1824 PCT PGR), 2005 WL
2835658, at *9 (quoting Navajo Nation President Shirley's statement to the U.N. Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organization) (internal quotation mark omitted) [hereinafter Navajo Summary
Judgment Response].
247. 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) af'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 479 F.3d




ment, the effluent still contained traces of fecal coliform bacteria. Snow-
bowl also sought to build a 14.8-mile-long pipeline in order to be able to
pump 1.5 million gallons of sewage effluent, in the form of artificial
snow, onto the mountain each day from November to February. 248 The
USFS's approval of the plan meant that Snowbowl could become the
world's first ski resort to depend entirely on sewage effluent for making
artificial snow.249
For the plaintiff tribes (the Navajo Nation, the Hualapai Tribe, the
Havasupai Tribe, the White Mountain Apache Nation, and the Yavapai-
Apache Nation), the San Francisco Peaks are sacred. Spraying the peaks
with snow made from sewage effluent would interfere, the tribes ex-
plained, with specific practices and substantially burden their exercise of
religion. 2 50 The San Francisco Peaks have been identified as a TCP by
the USFS and determined to be eligible for inclusion on the National
Register of Historic Places. In addition to the RFRA claim, the tribes
brought claims based on (1) failure to comply with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA), the NHPA, and the National Forest Man-
agement Act; (2) failure to consult properly with the tribes on a govern-
ment-to-government basis, as required by the Forest Service Manual,
NHPA regulations, and executive orders; and (3) violation of trust re-
sponsibilities.25 1
The plaintiff tribes explained in their motion for summary judgment
on their RFRA claim how the expansion project would substantially bur-
den their exercise of religion. For the people of the Yavapai-Apache Na-
tion, for example, the project would have a devastating impact on their
ability to practice their religion and conduct their daily lives. Councilman
Vincent Randall explained that "[t]he sacred Mountain is also a conduit
for our prayers to travel into the unseen spiritual world"252 and that the
proposed use of sewage effluent would "taint and scar the Mountain,
causing it to be ineffective, essentially killing the spiritual force within
248. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2007). The com-
mercial enterprise operating the resort is the Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership, which
operates under a forty-year special-use permit issued by the USFS.
249. Zackeree S. Kelin & Kimberly Younce Schooley, Dramatically Narrowing RFRA 's
Definition of "Substantial Burden" in the Ninth Circuit-The Vestiges of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association in Navajo Nation et al. v. United States Forest Service et al., 55
S.D. L. REV. 426, 432 (2010); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia A. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In
Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1118-24 (2009) (providing a thoughtful discussion of
Navajo Nation).
250. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1099- 1106 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (describing the spe-
cific practices of, and the plan's impact on, the various tribes).
251. See Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 15, 18, Navajo Nation
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (No. CV 05-1824 PCT PGR), 2005 WL
2835663, at *3, *15, *18.
252. Navajo Summary Judgment Response, supra note 246, at 8 (quoting Vincent Randall,
Dilzhe'e Apache historian and Yavapai-Apache Nation councilman) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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it.253 Anthony Lee, President of the Dine Hatallii Association (a Navajo
medicine men's organization), explained that Navajo "ceremonial songs,
prayers, and offerings will be affected negatively ... and thus, our
homes, children, and land will be significantly burdened. Our mountain
soil bundles and ceremonies will be tainted and contaminated. ... A
USFS archaeologist provided a concise summary of how the tribes view
the peaks:
(a) as a home of spiritual beings; (b) a place where significant mytho-
logical events occurred; (c) a place where spirits of the dead went to
be changed into bringers of rain; (d) personification of gods and god-
desses; (e) an area where important societies originated; and (f) as a
source of life.255
As to the Government's allegedly compelling interest in operating the
Snowbowl as a public recreation facility, the plaintiffs noted that the
Government had been able to do this for the past 70 years without the
proposed expansion and "nothing in this litigation would change that."2 56
Finally, the tribes argued that even if there were a compelling interest at
stake, the USFS had "selected the alternative that had the most signifi-
cant burden on practitioners of Native American religions"-hardly the
least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling interest.257 The
Forest Supervisor had even admitted that the effects on "traditional val-
ues" of the proposal that had been selected were "the most significant
and irreconcilable impacts of any proposal presented." 2 58
2. Holding Back the Waters of Snoqualmie Falls
[T]he mists created by the thunderous waters flowing over
Snoqualmie Falls connect the heavens and the earth.259
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion,260 the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe challenged an order of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granting a forty-year renewal of
the license of Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (Puget) to operate a hydroelec-
tric power plant, consisting of a dam and two powerhouses, at the
253. Id. (quoting Vincent Randall, Dilzhe'e Apache historian and Yavapai-Apache Nation
councilman) (internal quotation mark omitted).
254. Id. at 9 (quoting Anthony Lee, president of the Dine Hatallii Association) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The Dine Hatallii Association was formerly called the Navajo Medicine Men's
Association. Id; see also Kelin & Schooley, supra note 249, at 435-37 (describing the plaintiffs'
testimony about their religious exercise at the San Francisco Peaks and the impact of the proposal).
255. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
256. Navajo Summary Judgment Response, supra note 246, at *10-11.
257. Id at 14 (emphasis added).
258. Id
259. Tribe's Combined Reply and Intervenor's Brief at 1, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC,
545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 05-72739, 05-74060), 2006 WL 3856749, at *1 [hereinafter
Reply Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe].
260. 545 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008).
388 [Vol. 90:2
FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY
Snoqualmie Falls.2 6 1 The Snoqualmie Falls is located about thirty miles
east of Seattle, where the Snoqualmie River "flows down from the Cas-
cade Mountains."26 2
The litigation capped over a decade of efforts by the Snoqualmie
Tribe to protect the falls from the impact of the power plant's activities
under a new license, for which Puget had applied in 1991.263 The Federal
Power Act (FPA) requires FERC to balance a number of interests, in-
cluding tribal interests and recommendations, in making licensing deci-
sions.264 FERC has developed a policy statement on tribal consultation to
help it meet this requirement.265 The Snoqualmie Tribe, joined by envi-
ronmental and church groups, intervened in opposition to the application,
relying on the Free Exercise Clause, AIRFA, and RFRA.266 The Depart-
ment of the Interior and the American Civil Liberties Union also ex-
pressed concerns about the Snoqualmie Falls project and its effect on
Snoqualmie religious rights in comments filed with FERC.267
During the license renewal process, the Snoqualmie Tribe explained
that the power of the falls for religious observances "derives from the
quantity and quality of the Falls' mist and spray, which in turn is deter-
mined by the quantity of flow over the Falls."268 Although natural flows
support these practices, a proposal by Puget for a yearly allotment of
flows for the tribe's purposes did not. One religious practice, for exam-
ple, the vision quest, "is by nature an individual and spontaneous prac-
tice, not one which can be 'scheduled"' to coincide with Puget's pro-
posed flow allotments.269
In issuing the new license in 1994, however, FERC rejected the
Snoqualmie Tribe's arguments. Citing Lyng, the 1994 FERC license or-
der stated that "[i]ncidental effects of Government which may interfere
with the practice of religion, but do not coerce its practitioners into act-
ing contrary to their religious beliefs, do not, within the meaning of the
First Amendment, constitute a prohibition on the free exercise of reli-
261. Id. The plant consists of a dam and two powerhouses. Although FERC is an independent
regulatory agency, rather than an agency with the kind of management authority over public lands
held by the NPS and USFS, it is included in the discussion here because of the potential impact of its
licensing decisions on sacred sites. Id.
262. Id.
263. Order Issuing New License, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 107 F.E.R.C. 1| 61,331, at p.
62,513 (2004) [hereinafter Puget License Order].
264. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2006).
265. Policy Statement on Consultation with Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings, 18
C.F.R. § 2.1c (2003).
266. Puget License Order, supra note 263, at p. 62,514, 62 ,5 18 .
267. Id. at p. 62,518 n.35. The Snoqualmie Tribe's participation in the license renewal process
was complicated by the fact that much of the tribe's work to protect the falls coincided with efforts
to gain federal acknowledgment as a tribe, a goal that the Snoqualmie achieved in 1997. Final De-
termination to Acknowledge the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,864 (1997).
268. Puget License Order, supra note 263, at p. 62,518 n.33.
269. Id.
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gion."270 FERC was in compliance with AIRFA, the order claimed, as
long as it considers Indian leaders' views and "avoids unnecessary inter-
ference with Indian religious practices" in implementation of the pro-
ject.27 1 Finally, FERC rejected the application of RFRA, claiming it was
not applicable "to situations in which the Government took some action
which incidentally affected the quality of an individual's religious expe-
,,272rience.
FERC Commissioner Nora Mead Brownell dissented from the deci-
sion based on the license order's failure to strike the right balance be-
tween Puget's interests and recreational, cultural, and religious interests.
The license allowed minimum daytime water flows that were well below
those recommended by FERC's own staff in the Final Environmental
Impact Statement prepared for the project. She highlighted the differen-
tial treatment of tourism-related interests and Snoqualmie religious
needs: the order included staff-recommended increased flow require-
ments for the three-day Labor Day weekend for tourists' benefit while
rejecting, without explanation, the staff-recommended minimum-flow
increases for the benefit of the tribe.273
Following rehearing of the license order, at the Snoqualmie Tribe's
request, FERC agreed that the order's water certification flows did "not
sufficiently take account of the Tribe's concerns" and issued a new order
(the Rehearing Order).274 Rather than adopting the overall flows recom-
mended by FERC staff, however, the Rehearing Order only required
higher water flows over the falls in May and June, the months when the
greatest volume of mist (recognized as a "critical component of [the
Snoqualmie Tribe's] spiritual experience") naturally occurs. 2 75 The Re-
hearing Order met with the disapproval of Puget, which claimed that the
flow increases, based on the Snoqualmie Falls' religious significance to
the tribe, violated the Establishment Clause. 27 6 Both the tribe and Puget
sought Ninth Circuit review of the issuance of the Rehearing Order.2 7 7
270. Id. at p. 62,519 (footnote omitted) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439. 440, 447-48 (1988); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D. S.D. 1982), af'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983)).
271. Id
272. Id.
273. Id. at p. 62,541-43.
274. Order on Rehearing and Dismissing Stay Request, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 110
F.E.R.C. 161,200, at p. 61,746, 61,749 (2005).
275. Id at p. 61,746. FERC reasoned that "[gliven the size of the project ... the relatively
small effect on net annual benefit, and the importance of the mist at this site to the Snoqualmie
Tribe, raising the flows ... throughout the months of May and June appropriately balances compet-
ing interests." Id. One commissioner dissented, noting that he saw nothing to warrant the rebalancing
of the interests from the original order. Id. at p. 61,749.
276. Order Denying Rehearing, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., Ill F.E.R.C. 1 61,317, at p. 62,392
(2005). FERC rejected the Establishment Clause argument. Id. at p. 62,390.
277. The Snoqualmie Tribe argued that FERC used the wrong legal standard to review the
tribe's RFRA claim as to the Snoqualmie Falls project and that FERC's conclusion that the relicens-
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3. Threatening the Medicine Bluffs "Viewscape"
Not since the bloody days of the forced captivity of my ancestors
have we faced such an ominous threat.278
In Comanche Nation v. United States,27 9 the Comanche Nation and
Jimmy W. Arterberry Jr., the tribe's historic preservation officer, sought
an injunction against the construction of a warehouse for use by the U.S.
Army's Fort Sill, Oklahoma military installation. The proposed ware-
house would adversely impact the "viewscape" of Medicine Bluffs, a
landform within Fort Sill. As the Army knew, Medicine Bluffs is fre-
quently used by members of the Comanche, Kiowa, and Wichita Tribes
"for spiritual cleansings, vision quests, healing ceremonies, and as a
place of repose for deceased family member bodies or ashes." 28 0 Medi-
cine Bluffs was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1974
for being a unique geological feature and an area of significance to Na-
281tive Amencans.
The plaintiffs brought a claim under RFRA, alleging that the pro-
posed warehouse would impose a substantial burden on the conduct of
religious ceremonies and rituals by Arterberry and other practitioners of
Comanche traditional beliefs.282 Arterberry explained that Medicine
Bluffs is "the heart of the current Comanche Nation" and that the pro-
posed warehouse site would inhibit his view of the three peaks of Medi-
cine Bluffs, prevent him from orienting himself to the peaks, and prevent
him from "having a religious experience central to my way of life."283
The resulting impact of the proposed warehouse was grave indeed: it
"would completely prohibit members of the Comanche Nation from ex-
ercising their religion at the base of Medicine Bluffs . . . as they have
done for generations."284
ing did not substantially burden the tribe's exercise of religion was not supported by substantial
evidence. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008).
278. Complaint at Ex. 3, 2, Comanche Nation v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-00849-D, 2008
WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Comanche Nation Complaint] (quoting Letter
from Wahathuweeka (William G. Voelker), Chairman, Comanche Nation NAGPRA & Historic
Preservation Program, to Major General Peter Vangjel (Feb. 15, 2008)).
279. 2008 WL 4426621, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
280. Comanche Nation Complaint, supra note 278, at *3-4.
281. See Oklahoma National Register of Historic Places, NAT'L PARK SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/state/ok/list.htm?program-9F8DA718-155D-4519-3ElCC7FEEE2868BA (last
visited Jan. 3, 2013); see also National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form,
NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.ocgi.okstate.edu/shpo/nhrpdfs/74001659.pdf (last visited Oct. 30.,
2012).
282. Comanche Nation Complaint, supra note 278, at 4-5. The plaintiffs also brought a claim
under the NHPA, alleging that the Army had violated Section 106 of the NHPA by failing to consult
with them about the impact of the project on the Medicine Bluffs viewscape. Id.
283. Id. at Ex. 4, 1-2.
284. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 5,
Comanche Nation v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-00849 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008), 2008 WL
4426621, at *5.
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C. Resisting Religious Freedom Claims Under RFRA
1. Father Knows Best: Denying the Existence of a Substantial Bur-
den
In defending its actions under RFRA's requirements, the Govern-
ment argued in the cases outlined above that, contrary to the plaintiffs'
claims, either no burden was imposed on Indian religious exercise by the
challenged action or that the burden was not substantial. It stands to rea-
son that religious practitioners know best what kinds of government ac-
tions adversely impact their religious beliefs and practices, and how sig-
nificant the impact is or will be. The Government's argument in these
cases therefore amounts to a claim that the government knows more
about Indian religions than Indians do. Given the requirements of RFRA,
though, it is not surprising for the Government to argue that a plaintiffs
exercise of religion has not been substantially burdened in trying to
counter a RFRA claim, regardless of which religion's practitioners are
involved in a particular case. In light of the history of government policy
toward Indian religions and contemporary government commitments to
the protection of Indian religion and sacred sites, however, the argument
smacks of arrogance and continuing paternalism when made to counter
Indian RFRA claims.
The Government argued for a narrow definition of the "substantial
burden" concept in these cases. It sought to limit the concept to the fac-
tual situations present in pre-Smith and pre-RFRA cases in which the
Supreme Court invalidated governmental actions on Free Exercise
Clause grounds despite the fact that the language of RFRA does not limit
its application to these specific situations. Thus, in Navajo Nation, in
defending against the RFRA-based objection to using sewage effluent for
snowmaking before the Ninth Circuit, the Government emphasized that
(1) the Supreme Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause cases had inval-
idated governmental actions only when "individuals [were] forced to
choose between following the tenets of their religion and either receiving
a government benefit or [facing] criminal sanctions" 285 and (2) the Nava-
jo Nation plaintiffs were not faced with the choice between their reli-
gious beliefs and the receipt of a government benefit or the threat of
criminal sanctions.2 86 Therefore, the plaintiffs had failed to show that
285. Response Brief of the Fed. Appellees at 20-21, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S.
Ct. 2763 (2009) (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 1304732, at *20--21 [hereinafter U.S. Response Brief,
Navajo Nation] (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963)). The Government also argued that the USFS had complied with NEPA in Defendants' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 4, 20-21, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866
(D. Ariz. 2005) (Nos. CV 05-1824-PCT-PGR, CV 05-1914-PCT-EHC, CV 05-1949-PCT-NVW, CV
05-1966-PCT-JAT), 2005 WL 6169180, at *4, *20-21 [hereinafter U.S. Motion for Summary
Judgment, Navajo Nation].
286. U.S. Response Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 21.
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their free exercise of religion had been substantially burdened.287 Moreo-
ver, the Government claimed, the plaintiffs' ability to gather sacred ob-
jects and conduct ceremonies at the San Francisco Peaks was not being
impaired 28 8 despite the evidence to the contrary presented by the plain-
tiffs. 2 89 In the Government's view, actions that would desecrate a sacred
site in the eyes of those whose religious exercise rights were at stake
would not amount to a substantial burden on these rights.
Expanding on this point, the Government characterized Ninth Cir-
cuit precedents' substantial burden analysis under RFRA as requiring a
finding that the government's action is either preventing the practitioner
from engaging in religious activity (by making that activity impossible or
by penalizing that activity through criminal sanctions) or is putting sub-
stantial pressure on the practitioner to abandon his or her religiously mo-
tivated conduct 290 and argued that the evidence did not support such a
finding.291 In fact, the plaintiffs had offered evidence that the Govern-
ment's action of allowing the use of wastewater for snowmaking did
indeed prevent them from engaging in religious activity. Practitioners
would no longer be able to gather materials needed for medicine bundles
and other religious purposes if they had been contaminated by the use of
wastewater and therefore were no longer usable for these purposes.292
They would be prevented from engaging in gathering of these essential
materials due to the government-sanctioned contamination just as effec-
tively as if the practitioners were physically barred from visiting the
peaks. The Government cited additional Ninth Circuit precedents as es-
tablishing that a government action imposes a substantial burden if it
prevents an individual "from engaging in conduct or having a religious
experience which the faith mandates."2 93 Here again, it seems that con-
tamination of the sacred San Francisco Peaks by snow made from sew-
age effluent would have this impact on the plaintiffs by preventing them
from performing ceremonies or gathering materials at proper places, but
the Government denied that this was the case. Finally, the Government
rejected the Ninth Circuit's 2004 decision in San Jose Christian College
v. City of Morgan fill29 4 as affecting the substantial burden analysis or
287. Id. at 26.
288. U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 29.
289. The Ninth Circuit panel opinion included an extensive discussion of the specific impacts
on sites, ceremonies, and resources described by the plaintiff tribes. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034-43 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing Hopi, Navajo, Hualapai, and Havasupai
beliefs and practices, and the burdens that the proposed action would impose).
290. U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 25-26 (citing
Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 2002)).
291. Id. at 29 ("Plaintiffs have set forth no evidence that any of their members will be substan-
tially burdened by the government's actions . . . .").
292. E.g., Joint Opening Brief of Appellants Hualapai Tribe at 16, Hualapai Tribe v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-15371, 06-15455), 2006 WL 2429668, at *16.
293. U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 27 (quoting
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)).
294. 360 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004).
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its outcome because the latter case applied the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) rather than RFRA.295
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, in addressing the tribe's RFRA claim
as to the Puget hydroelectric project license order before the Ninth Cir-
cuit, FERC argued that in issuing the new license it "did not burden, let
alone 'substantially burden,' the Tribe's religious practices under
RFRA." 296 This claim was made despite the admission that the flow over
Snoqualmie Falls under the license would be less than the tribe had iden-
297tified as being necessary for religious purposes. FERC argued that a
government action does not impose a "substantial" burden on the prac-
tice of religion "where the action does not pressure the adherent to take
action forbidden by, or prevent the adherent from engaging in conduct
mandated by, that religion."298 FERC also relied on San Jose Christian
College-rejected by the Government as being relevant in Navajo Na-
tion-for guidance on the level of infringement that must be present for a
burden imposed by an action to be "substantial": "[T]he . .. action ...
'must be 'oppressive' to a 'significantly great' extent. That is, a 'substan-
tial burden' on 'religious exercise' must impose a significantly great re-
striction or onus upon such exercise."' 2 99 Although San Jose Christian
College defined "substantial burden" for the purposes of RLUIPA, FERC
noted that RLUIPA substantially tracks RFRA's language and was en-
acted in response to the partial invalidation of RFRA.3 00 FERC argued
that the tribe had failed to demonstrate that such a burden existed be-
cause the license issuance would not require members of the Snoqualmie
Tribe to violate their beliefs nor prohibit their access to the falls.3 0 1
FERC emphasized that the Snoqualmie Tribe was still practicing its reli-
gion at the falls and still regarded the falls as sacred, as if a substantial
295. Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 21,
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F.Supp.2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (Nos. CV 05-1824-PCT-
PGR, CV 05-1914-PCT-EHC, CV 05-1949-PCT-NVW, CV 05-1966-PCT-JAT), 2005 WL
2835678, at *21 (citing San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034-35
(9th Cir. 2004)). The Government also argued that even if the Ninth Circuit's current "substantial
burden" definition is best described by San Jose Christian College and a subsequent case, Warsol-
dier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005), the plaintiffs "had still failed to establish that their
religious exercise was 'substantially burdened."' Response Brief of the Federal Appellees at 3 1,
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (No. 06-15371), 2006
U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 737, at *31 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation].
296. Brief of Respondent FERC at 11, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th
Cir. 2006) (No. 05-72739), 2006 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 851, at *14-[hereinafter FERC Brief,
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe].
297. Id. at 22 n.7.
298. Id. at 25 (citing Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1996)).
299. Id. (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
300. Id at 25 n.8.
301. Id at 27; see also id. at 31-33 ("[T]he religious adherent bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that it cannot accomplish the mandates of its religion because of the government's action.").
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burden would exist only if the tribe had been forced to completely aban-
don worship at the falls. 30 2
In Comanche Nation, the Government argued that no burden would
be imposed on the plaintiffs' ability to exercise their religion by the Ar-
my's construction of the planned warehouse at Fort Sill. Having claimed
that no burden would be imposed, the Government did not offer a defini-
tion of "substantial burden."3 03 The Government argued that "there are
numerous other places where the Bluffs can be viewed," 3  a statement
that ignored the evidence that particular viewscapes of the Bluffs are
significant in Comanche religious practices. The Government was simi-
larly dismissive of the idea that moving forward with the warehouse con-
struction would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs (a requirement
for a temporary restraining order), disputing their "claim that the TSC
[Training Support Center] warehouse site is the only location to view the
Bluffs, practice their sacred ceremonies or ascend up the slop[e] to the
top of the Bluffs." 305
In summary, in these RFRA cases, the Government denied, or min-
imized, the impact of land managers' actions on Indian religious exer-
cise. On the other hand, in defending government actions against Estab-
lishment Clause challenges in the cases discussed in Part I, the Govern-
ment not only admitted that its actions had negatively impacted Indian
religious exercise but also has used this impact as a legal justification-a
permissible secular purpose-for the challenged action.3 06 Somehow the
government has developed myopia, or perhaps willful blindness, as to
such impacts in the RFRA context.
2. It's Our Land: Privileging Other Interests over Religious Exer-
cise Rights
In the sacred sites cases discussed in Part I, the Government de-
fended its decisions to act in ways that fostered respect for, and were
designed to prevent interference with, Indian religious exercise on public
lands. Moreover, the Government spoke of the taking of the land con-
taining sacred sites from tribes, and the government's special relationship
302. Id. at 34.
303. Federal Defendants' Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order with Brief at 25-
26, Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla. Sept.
23, 2008), 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 97564, at *39 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Comanche
Nation]. The court explained the threshold requirements for a RFRA claim:
Plaintiffs must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the governmental
action complained of (1) substantially burdens, (2) a religious belief rather than a philos-
ophy or way of life (3) which belief is sincerely held by the Plaintiffs. Only after Plain-
tiffs establish these threshold requirements does the burden shift to the government.
Id at 26 (quoting Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 942 F. Supp. 511, 517 (W.D. Okla.
1996), af'd, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Id at 25 n.14.
305. Id. at 26.
306. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.
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with tribes, as necessitating the solicitude for Indian religious exercise
rights that the challenged management plans reflected. In other words,
the fact this was "the government's land" did not relieve the government
of responsibilities toward Indian religious practitioners.
Once again, the Government told a different story as to the signifi-
cance of its property rights in the RFRA cases. While denying that Indian
religious exercise was substantially burdened within the meaning of
RFRA, the Government went on to argue in the RFRA sacred-sites cases
that even a substantial burden would be justifiable because of the other
interests tied to public lands that were at stake-interests that were
deemed more important than religious exercise. Thus, in Navajo Nation,
the Government argued that even if the snowmaking plan constituted a
substantial burden, the USFS had a compelling interest in providing op-
portunities for recreation on public lands. The Government rejected the
claim (made by amici curiae) that the Government's actual "compelling"
interest was ensuring profits for Snowbowl, whose economic viability
was dependent on adequate snow, which could not be ensured by reli-
ance on natural snowfall alone in the San Francisco Peaks' desert envi-
ronment.30 s The USFS had, the Government claimed, "worked hard to
protect the natural resources that the tribes value for their religious pur-
poses," but the USFS has to "make hard choices." 309 In this case, the
"hard" choice was to treat skiing and other forms of recreation as more
important uses of the peaks than religious exercise by allowing desecra-
tion of the peaks by snow made from sewage effluent.
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, FERC maintained that the license order
advanced "myriad compelling governmental interests," such as "the pro-
vision of needed generation [of power] in the Puget service area; ... the
preservation of recreational benefits; [and] the provision of flood control
benefits"310 -benefits that presumably redounded primarily to non-
Indians. According to FERC, the sacrifice of a certain faith's religious
practices for "the common good" 311 could be required in order "to main-
tain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great
variety of faiths."312 As had so often been the case in the past, Indians
could be compelled to pay the price of decisions designed to benefit the
(non-Indian) public good.
307. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 37; id. at 44 (identifying provision of public
safety by expanding the facilities to reduce alleged overcrowding, also, as a compelling interest).
308. Id. at 41.
309. Id at 40. Other changes approved in the expansion plan included increases in the skiable
acreage and the creation of a snowplay area. Id. at 6-7. The Government identified providing for
public safety, by expanding the facilities to reduce alleged overcrowding, as a compelling interest as
to these changes. Id. at 43.
310. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 35-36 (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 36 (quoting Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir. 1996)).




In Comanche Nation as well, the Government argued that even if
the court determined that Comanche practitioners were "nominally bur-
dened in their religious practices," the construction of the warehouse was
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.3 13 The warehouse
was needed, the Government claimed, to support "an increased mission"
at Fort Sill that will result in an influx of new soldiers. 3 14 The military's
claimed needs trumped mere religious needs.
Defending land managers' decisions in the RFRA cases, the Gov-
ernment thus argued that other interests should be privileged over Indian
religious exercise. Although accommodation of Indian religious exercise
and protection of sacred sites was acknowledged as legally justified-
and in some cases even legally compelled-in the Establishment Clause
cases examined in Part I, these concerns fell by the wayside, pushed out
of the way by (more) compelling interests, in the RFRA cases.
3. We Did the Best We Could: RFRA's "Least Restrictive Means"
Requirement
In addressing the "least restrictive means" component of the RFRA
test, the Government argued in Navajo Nation that the USFS had chosen
the least restrictive means to further its compelling interests because it
had tried to minimize adverse impacts on tribal culture and religion and
had "considered all feasible alternative water sources for snowmak-
ing."3 15 From the plaintiff tribes' perspective, though, the agency had not
tried hard enough to prevent desecration of the San Francisco Peaks-
clearly an adverse impact-and the water source that it approved for
snowmaking-sewage effluent-was not one that the tribes saw as "fea-
sible." Feasibility was judged on the basis of land managers', rather than
religious practitioners', sense of what was acceptable at a sacred site.
The Government dismissed the testimony of a USFS archaeologist that
another alternative, which eliminated the use of sewage effluent, would
have satisfied the expansion project's purpose and need, arguing that she
did not fully understand the implications of the competing policies being
considered.3 16
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, FERC similarly claimed that the new
license order advanced compelling interests using the least restrictive
means by preserving power generation while respecting tribal inter-
ests.317 FERC repeatedly insisted that the new license order was actually
beneficial to the Snoqualmie Tribe's religious exercise, as if FERC offi-
cials believed that the tribe was unable to comprehend the benefits that it
313. U.S. Brief, Comanche Nation, supra note 303, at 30.
314. Id. at 8.
315. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 45-46 (emphasis added).
316. Id. at 46, 54 n.9 (indicating that the alternative mentioned in the testimony, Alternative 3,
did not use reclaimed water).
317. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 38.
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received under the license order, but if reminded of them repeatedly the
tribe would eventually understand and stop complaining. Although
FERC's argument was based on the fact that the new order undid some
of the harm done by the previous license order by restoring water flows
beyond what was required under that license, this improvement as com-
pared to past-required flows did not mean that there could not be grounds
for concern based on the present flows. In other words, some lessening of
burdens does not mean that they no longer exist or are not still substan-
tial. FERC's argument seems akin to reasoning that a prison immate
whom a warden had beaten three times a week has no grounds to com-
plain about being beaten once the beatings are reduced to twice a week.
In Comanche Nation, the Government did not explicitly address the
least restrictive means element of RFRA. After claiming that it has
"more than met the showing required" that the warehouse construction is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, the Government
simply scoffed some more at the plaintiffs' claim that their religious ex-
ercise was burdened. Characterizing the plaintiffs' use of the site "at least
annually" (according to plaintiff Arterberry) as "infrequent use,"318 the
Government stressed the alleged harm (financial and other) to the Gov-
ernment from the continuation of the restraining order, compared to the
"little if any injury to the Plaintiffs." 3 19 The public interest, the Govern-
ment argued, supported lifting the temporary restraining order that had
been imposed on the warehouse project:
It is in the public's interest to have a well-trained and equipped mili-
tary engaged in the War on Terror [and] to ensure that its environ-
mental laws and historical preservation laws are not 'highjacked' and
agencies held hostage, based upon frivolous or specious claims.320
This appeal to anxiety over the "War on Terror" as justification for ac-
tions that burden religious exercise brings to mind the concern voiced in
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Smith with regard to what Justice
Blackmun termed the "war on drugs." 32 1 Although Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the majority's refusal to apply the compelling interest
test, she concluded that the test was satisfied because of the State's com-
pelling interest in confronting drug abuse, "one of the most serious prob-
lems confronting our society today."322 In both situations, so the story
318. U.S. Brief, Comanche Nation, supra note 303, at 25.
319. Id. at 26. In addition to financial costs, other claimed impacts were on the Army's ability
to train newly arriving soldiers. Id at 26-29.
320. Id. at 29.
321. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909-10 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (applying
the compelling interest test in his opinion, Justice Blackmun explained that "[i]t is not the State's
broad interest in fighting the critical 'war on drugs' that must be weighed against respondents' claim,
but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of
peyote").
322. Id. at 903-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice O'Connor concurred in
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went, suppression of Indian religious freedom was not too high a price to
pay for allegedly greater security against perceived threats.
4. The Long Shadow of Lyng
The discussion above has focused on the Government's efforts to
respond to specific elements of the RFRA test. It is also instructive to
examine the role played in the Government's RFRA defense by some of
the more sacred sites-, and Indian-, specific considerations that figured in
the Government's arguments in response to the Establishment Clause
challenges addressed in Part I. In that context, the Government relied on
the Lyng majority opinion's encouragement of accommodation of reli-
gious exercise on public lands as support for the agency decisions at is-
sue. The Lyng holding itself was distinguished as not being on point be-
cause a voluntary government accommodation, rather than a Free Exer-
cise Clause claim, was at issue.
In the RFRA cases, Lyng played a different (and, from the perspec-
tive of the plaintiffs, decidedly less benign) role. In Navajo Nation, for
example, the Government relied on Lyng as support for its argument that
the plaintiffs had not established that their free exercise of religion was
substantially burdened.323 The Government described the facts of Lyng as
being "somewhat analogous to the present case, as both involve free ex-
ercise challenges by Indian tribes to a Forest Service project on public
lands."324 The plaintiff tribes were charged with asking the court to per-
mit an action that Lyng had rejected: the imposing of "a 'religious servi-
tude' on public lands preventing the government from managing those
lands in the public interest,325-Or at least in the interest of members of
the public who did not regard the area in question as sacred.
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, FERC argued that Lyng "remains good
law" and that RFRA was not intended to invalidate it.326 Likening the
tribe's claim to that of the plaintiffs in Lyng, and using the same indig-
nant tone that characterized parts of the Lyng opinion, FERC warned of
the threat that the claim posed: "[T]his case involves nothing less than
the judgment in Smith on the basis of her application of the compelling interest test. She concluded
that the State had a compelling interest in regulating peyote use and that accommodating the Native
American Church members' religiously motivated conduct would unduly interfere with the fulfill-
ment of that interest. Id. at 907; see also id at 906 ("I believe that granting a selective exemption in
this case would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by
its citizens."). Justice Blackmun pointed out in his opinion, however, the contrast between sacramen-
tal peyote use and "the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of unlawful drugs" that impli-
cated health and safety concerns. Id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
323. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 24, 28.
324. Id. at 24.
325. Id. at 40-41 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452
(1988)).
326. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 28-31.
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the government's authority and responsibility to regulate the public use
of its jurisdictional waterways." 327
5. The Role of the Establishment Clause
In cases discussed in Part I, the Government explicitly argued that it
could take into account Indian religious beliefs and practices in making
land management decisions without violating the Establishment
Clause.328 In the RFRA cases, on the other hand, the Government argued
that one of the justifications for imposing a burden on religious beliefs
and practices was compliance with the Establishment Clause. Thus, in
Navajo Nation, the Government noted that in making land use decisions,
the USFS "must be guided not only by its statutory duties, but also by
constitutional constraints," such as compliance with the Establishment
Clause.329 The Government insisted that the USFS had "provided a num-
ber of accommodations" to the plaintiff tribes during the development of
the expansion project, such as eliminating night skiing and lighting, seek-
ing to provide access to religious practitioners during construction, and
permitting the gathering of materials for religious practices, consistent
with both the Constitution and the USFS's multiple-use mandate.3 30 Ar-
guments that additional accommodations could be provided without vio-
lating the Establishment Clause were discounted.3 In short, the attitude
displayed toward the tribes was that having received some accommoda-
tions, they should be satisfied and not greedily demand more.
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, however, the Establishment Clause ap-
peared in a different guise. In addition to responding to the tribe's argu-
ment that its religious exercise had not received the protection required
pursuant to RFRA, FERC needed to respond to Puget's objections to the
required increased water flows for the purported benefit of tribal reli-
gious exercise under the Rehearing Order. Although Puget had not re-
newed in the Ninth Circuit proceedings the specific Establishment
Clause objection that it had raised in the FERC proceedings, 33 2 it still
objected to the impact of tribal religious needs on setting flow require-
ments. Puget argued that there was no evidence to support FERC's find-
ing that the flow that FERC ordered "will supply spray and mist suffi-
cient to provide the Tribe with a satisfactory religious and spiritual expe-
rience."3 Defending its decision, FERC explained that it had concluded
327. Id. at 37.
328. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
329. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 41-42. In its brief to the Ninth Circuit, the
Government quoted the statement of the district court that "compliance with the Establishment
Clause is an additional compelling governmental interest." Id
330. Id. at 42.
331. Id (discounting additional accommodations mentioned by the amici curiae as either
similar to the accommodations already given or as not requested by the plaintiff tribes).
332. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
333. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 54.
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that even though the flow level that it approved "would not provide the
full natural flows the Tribe requested, it could still enhance the Falls'
cultural value."334 FERC thus played its Establishment Clause cards in
two ways: (1) in defending its conduct against the RFRA claim, it argued
that it had been solicitous toward the Snoqualmie Tribe and its religious
needs, but (2) in responding to Puget's objection to the flow require-
ments, FERC downplayed the level of protection that it had provided.
6. Ignoring or Deflecting the Political and Trust Relationships
In the Establishment Clause challenges discussed in Part I, the Gov-
ernment cited its political relationship with and trust responsibilities to-
wards tribes in addressing the secular purpose and secular effect prongs
of the Lemon test and the endorsement test. In Bear Lodge, for example,
the Government acknowledged a trust relationship-based need to protect
Indian religious exercise even on federal (as opposed to trust) land."'
In the RFRA challenges to land management decisions, however,
the Government seemed to have developed amnesia with regard to these
important aspects of the federal-tribal relationship. In Navajo Nation, for
example, the Government did not even address the issue of whether the
approval of the expansion project violated the Government's trust or
political relationship with the plaintiff tribes in its brief to the Ninth Cir-
cuit. In the district court proceedings, the Government had addressed the
trust responsibility but downplayed it, asserting that the only trust duty
that was applicable was the duty to comply "with generally applicable
regulations and statutes," which (it claimed) the USFS had done.336 The
fact that the lands affected by the USFS decision were not held in trust
for the tribes was also emphasized.33 7
The Government did not refer to the trust responsibility or the Unit-
ed States' political relationship in either Snoqualmie Indian Tribe or Co-
manche Nation. Thus, these principles did not enter into the Govern-
ment's interpretation of the balancing of interests required by RFRA.
D. The Mixed Judicial Response to Sacred Sites RFRA Claims
In contrast to the rejection of the Establishment Clause claims of all
of the plaintiffs in the challenges to the land management decisions dis-
cussed above (albeit in some cases on the basis of lack of standing rather
than on the merits), the judicial response to the tribes' RFRA claims was
mixed. There were differences of opinion within circuits not only as be-
tween lower courts and appellate courts and between a court of appeals
334. Id. at 55.
335. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
336. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 33, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2005) (No. 3:05-cv-01824-PGR), 2005 WL 6169180, at *33.
337. Id. at 34.
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panel and the full court, but also as between courts in different circuits.
As the discussion below demonstrates, the proper interpretation of the
term "substantial burden"-left undefined by Congress in RFRA-is a
key point of contention.
1. Measuring the Burden Imposed on Religious Exercise
In Navajo Nation, the district court rejected the plaintiff tribes'
RFRA and other claims, 3 an outcome that the plaintiffs appealed. A
three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's RFRA
decision in 2007.339 The panel noted that although the appellant tribes'
beliefs and practices are not uniform and therefore the precise burden
imposed on their religious exercise varied, the burdens fell into two cate-
gories: "the contamination of natural resources necessary for the perfor-
mance of certain religious ceremonies" and the undermining of their "re-
ligious faith, practices, and way of life by desecrating the Peaks' puri-
ty."340 Applying Ninth Circuit precedents, the panel concluded that the
burden on the exercise of religion imposed by the USFS was a substan-
tial burden, i.e., one that is more than just an inconvenience and that pre-
vents practitioners "from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a
religious experience," 341 and that the Government had failed to show that
"approving the proposed action serves a compelling governmental inter-
est by the least restrictive means." 342
The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, reversed the panel deci-
sion in favor of the plaintiffs. The court accepted the Government's re-
strictive definition of "substantial burden," holding that "a 'substantial
burden' is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between
following the tenets of their religion and receiving a government benefit
(Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the
threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder)."3 43 Thus the court relied on
a narrow definition that is not part of the statutory text, but rather is
based on restricting the concept of a substantial burden to the kinds of
338. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 874-76, 878 (rejecting plaintiffs' NEPA claim); id. at
880 (rejecting plaintiffs' NHPA claim); id. at 881 (rejecting plaintiffs' National Forest Management
Act claim); id. at 882 (rejecting plaintiffs' breach of trust claim); id at 906-07 (rejecting plaintiffs'
RFRA claim). The district court found (1) that the tribes had failed to demonstrate that the project
caused a substantial burden (as the court narrowly defined the term); (2) that the Government had
three compelling interests at stake; and (3) that the Government had adopted the least restrictive
means to achieve these interests. Id.
339. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F. 3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006).
340. Id. at 1039, 1041; see also id at 1039 (describing the burdens more fully as "(1) the
inability to perform a particular religious ceremony, because the ceremony requires collecting natu-
ral resources from the Peaks that would be too contaminated ... for sacramental use; and (2) the
inability to maintain daily and annual religious practices comprising an entire way of life, because
the practices require belief in the mountain's purity or a spiritual connection to the mountain that
would be undermined by the contamination").
341. Id at 1043 (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (describing substantial burden analysis).
342. Id at 1046 (compelling interest test conclusion).
343. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008).
402 [Vol. 90:2
FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY
scenarios that happened to be present in two cases, Sherbert and Yoder,
that were referenced in the purposes section of RFRA.3" Congress cited
these cases (neither of which used the term "substantial burden") in
RFRA to indicate the kind of test that was to be applied (in place of the
Smith approach) to government actions that substantially burden free
exercise of religion. The language of RFRA does not limit the kinds of
fact situations in which a substantial burden would be found to exist and
the test consequently applies. Applying its narrow definition, the Ninth
Circuit held that because the "presence of recycled wastewater [i.e.,
treated sewage effluent] on the Peaks does not coerce the Plaintiffs to act
contrary to their religious beliefs under the threat of sanctions" and does
not "condition a governmental benefit upon conduct that would violate
their religious beliefs," there was no substantial burden on religious ex-
ercise that would necessitate application of the compelling interest test.345
Three judges joined in a strongly worded dissent charging that the
majority, in holding that "spraying 1.5 million gallons per day of treated
sewage effluent on the most sacred mountain of southwestern Indian
tribes does not 'substantially burden' their 'exercise of religion,"' com-
mitted three fundamental errors: misstating the evidence below, misstat-
ing the law under RFRA, and misunderstanding "the very nature of reli-
gion." 34 6 The dissent faulted the majority for adopting a narrow defimi-
tion of "substantial burden" by wrongly "looking to Sherbert and Yoder
for an exhaustive definition of what constitutes a 'substantial burden.' 347
The majority showed misunderstanding of the nature of religious belief
and practice by emphasizing lack of physical harm. In reality,
"[r]eligious belief concerns the human spirit and religious faith, not
344. Id at 1068 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963)). In Sherbert, the Court upheld the free exercise claim of a Seventh Day Adventist who
had been denied unemployment compensation benefits after she was discharged from her job for
refusal to work on her religion's Sabbath. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399, 402. The Court held that the
disqualification for benefits imposed a burden on the free exercise of her religion because "[i]f the
purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions ... that law is constitu-
tionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." Id. at 403-04
(alteration in original) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government had not shown that a compelling state interest, which
could not bezachieved without infringement on her rights, justified the infringement. Id. at 409. In
Yoder, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the State from compel-
ling Old Order Amish parents, whose religious beliefs precluded public high school attendance, to
send their children to public school up to age sixteen. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. The Court found that
secondary schooling "contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith" and that
the impact of the compulsory attendance law on the practice of the Amish religion was "not only
severe, but inescapable." Id. at 218. The Court stated that "only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id.
at 215.
345. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1067.
346. Id. at 1081 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). For the dissent's elaboration on these points, see id.
at 1085-96 (addressing claimed misstatements of the law under RFRA).
347. Id. at 1086 (discussing six reasons why Sherbert and Yoder should not be looked to for an
exhaustive definition of "substantial burden").
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physical harm and scientific fact."348 The dissent suggested a potential
source for the majority's misunderstanding:
Perhaps the strength of the Indians' argument in this case could be
seen more easily by the majority if another religion were at issue....
I do not think that the majority would accept that the burden on a
Christian's exercise of religion would be insubstantial if the govern-
ment permitted only treated sewage effluent for use as baptismal wa-
ter, based on an argument that no physical harm would result and any
adverse effect would merely be on the Christian's "subjective spiritu-
al experience." Nor do I think the majority would accept such an ar-
gument for an orthodox Jew, if the government permitted only non-
Kosher food. 349
The dissent observed that there was a "tragic irony" in the majority's
emphasizing that the area at issue is "public park land" that belongs to
everyone:
The United States government took this land from the Indians by
force. The majority now uses that forcible deprivation as a justifica-
tion for spraying treated sewage effluent on the holiest of the Indians'
holy mountains, and for refusing to recognize that this action consti-
tutes a substantial burden on the Indians' exercise of their religion.
RFRA was passed to protect the exercise of all religions, including
the religions of American Indians. If Indians' land-based exercise of
religion is not protected by RFRA in this case, I cannot imagine a
case in which it will be. I am truly sorry that the majority has effec-
tively read American Indians out of RFRA. 350
The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in 2009, urging the
Supreme Court to step in to resolve the growing disagreement among the
federal circuits as to the proper approach to determining whether a sub-
stantial burden exists under RFRA,35 1 but to no avail.352
The Ninth Circuit's restrictive definition of a "substantial burden"
under RFRA in Navajo Nation has negatively impacted efforts to protect
other sacred sites, such as the efforts of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe at
Snoqualmie Falls. In its 2008 opinion in Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, a
three-judge Ninth Circuit panel described the falls as being "considered a
sacred site by the few hundred enrolled members who today comprise
348. Id. at 1098.
349. Id. at 1097.
350. Id. at 1113-14.
351. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-20, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct.
2763 (2009) (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 46999, at *12-20 (noting the three approaches taken to the
substantial burden concept). The petition identified the Fourth and D.C. Circuits as sharing the Ninth
Circuit's restrictive definition; the Eighth and Tenth Circuits as adopting a much broader conception;
and four other circuits (the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits) as taking an intermediate
approach. Id. at 12-19.
352. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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the Snoqualmie Tribe," without indicating why the size of the tribe is
relevant to the analysis.3 53 The court noted a number of aspects of the
significance of the falls, such as its central role in the Snoqualmie Tribe's
creation story and its being considered the dwelling place of a powerful
water spirit (in the plunge pool below the falls).354 It was in light of these
and other considerations that the Snoqualmie Falls has been designated
as TCP eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.355
The tribe identified a number of ways in which the Snoqualmie
Falls project substantially burdened its exercise of religion: "[Ilts opera-
tion deprives the Tribe of access to the Falls for vision quests and other
religious experiences, eliminates the mist necessary for the Tribe's reli-
gious experiences, and alters the ancient sacred cycle of water flowing
over the Falls."3 56 Tribal members have had a sacred connection with the
falls "since time immemorial," and have believed for centuries "that the
mists created by the thunderous waters flowing over Snoqualmie Falls
connect the heavens and the earth." 357 The project "divert[s] nearly all
flows away from the Falls" and has "prevented tribal members from en-
gaging in many traditional religious activities,"358 imposing a burden on
religious exercise that is "monstrous and substantial under RFRA."359
The Snoqualmie Tribe urged the court to interpret the term "substantial
burden" in accordance with its plain meaning and to recognize that the
RFRA test applies "whenever a law or an action taken by the government
to implement a law burdens a person's exercise of religion."
360
The Ninth Circuit panel, however, simply looked to Navajo Nation,
noting that the decision adopted "a narrower definition of that term [i.e.,
substantial burden] than we had in prior decisions."361 The court thus
highlighted the Ninth Circuit's narrowing of the protection available to
religious practitioners under RFRA in Navajo Nation, in marked contrast
to Congress's intent to ensure that free exercise protection was not nar-
rowly circumscribed.36 2 Applying Navajo Nation's narrowed "substantial
353. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1211 (2008). The court heard argu-
ments in 2007, but recognizing the significance of the then forthcoming Navajo Nation en banc
decision, waited to make its decision until the Navajo Nation en banc opinion was published. Id at
1210.
354. Id. at 1211.
355. Id
356. Id. at 1213.
357. Reply Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 259, at 1.
358. Id.
359. Id at 14.
360. Id at 25 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 5 (1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
361. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008). The court noted
that as defined in Navajo Nation, "a substantial burden is imposed only when.individuals are forced
to choose between following tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert)
or [are] coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by threat of civil or criminal sanctions
(Yoder)." Id. at 1214 (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
362. Id at 1214.
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burden" definition, the court said it does not matter if the Puget hydroe-
lectric project interferes with tribal members' ability to practice their
religion. 36 3 Because the court did not see "any evidence demonstrating
that Snoqualmie Tribe members will lose a government benefit or face
criminal or civil sanctions for practicing their religion," it held that
FERC's relicensing decision did not impose a substantial burden on trib-
al members' ability to exercise their religion.3 6 The decision made it
clear that the Navajo Nation substantial burden interpretation provides
courts in the Ninth Circuit, and in other circuits that agree with the Ninth
Circuit approach, with a mechanism to head off tribes' RFRA claims
without having to evaluate the Government's compliance with the com-
pelling interest test.
The decision in Comanche Nation, on the other hand, demonstrates
that a different outcome is possible in sacred sites claims under RFRA
when a court does not rely on the Ninth Circuit's restrictive approach to
identifying a substantial burden. After the district court issued a tempo-
rary restraining order against the Fort Sill warehouse construction, the
United States sought dissolution of the order. 365 In considering the claim
that construction of the warehouse substantially interfered with the exer-
cise of the religious beliefs of the individual plaintiff and other members
of the Comanche Nation, the court noted that although RFRA defines
"exercise of religion" and courts have recognized the exercise of Native
American traditional religions as an "exercise of religion," RFRA does
not define "substantial burden." 366 As the Tenth Circuit has defined the
term, in order for a governmental action to be considered to substantially
burden a religious exercise, it must "'significantly inhibit or constrain
conduct or expression' or 'deny reasonable opportunities to engage in'
religious activities." 3 67 The court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit
definition applied in Navajo Nation, noting that the Tenth Circuit has not
adopted that definition.368
363. Id ("The Tribe's arguments that the dam interferes with the ability of tribal members to
practice religion are irrelevant to whether the hydroelectric project either forces them to choose
between their religion and receiving a government benefit or coerces them into a Catch-22 situation:
exercise of their religion under fear of civil or criminal sanction.").
364. Id. at 1214-15. The court also rejected the Snoqualmie Tribe's argument that FERC
violated the NHPA by not consulting with the tribe on a government-to-government basis on the
grounds that the key documents that were generated pursuant to the NHPA Section 106 process (a
cultural plan, an historical plan, and a programmatic agreement) were finalized before the tribe was
federally recognized. Id. at 1216.
365. Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
366. Id at *3.
367. Id (quoting Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996)). The court relied on a
definition from Thiry, which was decided prior to the 2000 amendment of RFRA, but noted that
Tenth Circuit cases subsequent to the amendment did "not appear to signal a restrictive application




Applying the Tenth Circuit "substantial burden" definition, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits of their RFRA claim.369 The approach to
Medicine Bluffs that would be impacted by the proposed warehouse is,
and historically has been, a Comanche sacred site and the situs of tradi-
tional Comanche religious practices. These practices constitute a sincere
exercise of religion; therefore, the construction of the warehouse would
impose a substantial burden on Comanche religious practices. Noting
that Comanche traditional religious practices "are inextricably inter-
twined with the natural environment," the court explained that as far as
practices in relation to the Bluffs are concerned, "an unobstructed view
of all four Bluffs is central to the spiritual experience of the Comanche
people." 37 0 The proposed warehouse site was in an area offering the last
open, unobstructed viewscape from the south of the Bluffs and the only
available vantage point for viewing all four Bluffs. Moreover, the ware-
house would occupy the area representing the central sightline to the
Bluffs, in which practitioners center themselves on the gap between two
of the Bluffs, known as Sweet Medicine. The obstruction that the ware-
house would create in this area, along with the increased, disruptive ve-
hicular traffic that was expected to accompany it, would constitute a sub-
stantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious practices.37'
2. Balancing the Interests at Stake
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit panel, having found a substan-
tial burden on religious exercise, rejected the argument that the approval
of the proposed expansion advanced compelling governmental interests.
The USFS's interest in managing the forest for multiple uses, including
skiing, is the kind of broadly formulated interest that the Supreme Court
found to be inadequate in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficent Uni-
ao do Vegetal,372 the panel opinion noted.37 3 Moreover, even if the sur-
vival of the Snowbowl as a commercial ski area depends upon being able
to use sewage effluent for snowmaking, this did not necessarily mean
that there was a compelling governmental interest in avoiding this result.
After all, given the San Francisco Peaks' location in a desert, "it is (and




372. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431-32
(2006).
373. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 431). In Gonzales, the Court applied RFRA and held that the federal Goveniment had
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in barring sacramental use by members of a religious sect
of hoasca, a tea that is brewed from an Amazonian plant that contains a substance listed on Schedule
I of the Controlled Substances Act. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 438-39. The Government had conceded




was known to the previous Snowbowl owners when they expanded it and
to the current owners (who now wanted "to change these natural condi-
tions by adding treated sewage effluent") when they bought it. 374 Given
the many other recreational activities available on the peaks, authorizing
the proposed use of sewage effluent for snowmaking was not justified by
the claimed compelling governmental interest in providing for public
recreational use.375
When the Ninth Circuit considered the case en banc, however, the
court's conclusion that there was no substantial burden on religious exer-
cise obviated the need to apply the compelling interest test.376 The court
treated the plaintiffs as if their claims stemmed from having their feel-
ings hurt and from being too quick to take offense, dismissively stating
that "the burden of the recycled wastewater can only be expressed by the
Plaintiffs as damaged spiritual feelings."377 Similarly, in Snoqualmie
Indian Tribe, the Ninth Circuit, having concluded that the tribe's reli-
gious exercise was not substantially burdened, did not put FERC to the
test of showing that the project serves a compelling interest. FERC was
therefore not required to show that its relicensing decision was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. 7
In Comanche Nation, in examining the evidence of the significance
of the government interest at stake, an Oklahoma federal district court
concluded that although there was conflicting evidence about the neces-
sity of the proposed warehouse, it would accept military officials' testi-
mony that it was essential to Fort Sill's training mission. 379 Although this
amounted to a substantial demonstration by the defendants that the con-
struction of the warehouse was in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest, there was no evidence that construction of the warehouse
in its proposed location was the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest. Indeed, the evidence showed that officials had identified a much
less restrictive alternative location but had not seriously considered it.
The defendants had not only failed to consider less restrictive alternatives
but had also failed to consider the plaintiffs' religious practices at all.
Because it seemed unlikely that the defendants could meet their burden
374. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1045.
375. Id. The court also rejected the asserted interest in protecting public safety as justifying the
proposed expansion: "[A]lithough the Forest Service undoubtedly has a general interest in ensuring
public safety on federal lands, there has been no showing that approving the proposed action ad-
vances that interest by the least restrictive means." Id.
376. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
377. Id. at 1070 n.12.
378. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008).
379. Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 442662 1, at * 17 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
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of proof under RFRA, there was a substantial likelihood that the plain-
tiffs would succeed in their claim. 80
Having found that the Comanche plaintiffs had demonstrated a sub-
stantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court reviewed the re-
maining requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction: irrepara-
ble harm to the plaintiffs if the injunction were denied, threatened harm
to the plaintiffs outweighing harm to the defendants if the injunction
were issued, and issuance of the injunction not being adverse to the pub-
lic interest.381 The court concluded that construction of a permanent
structure that would impose a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' reli-
gious practices would constitute irreparable harm and that any monetary
damages that the defendants might incur if an injunction were issued
"pale[d] in comparison to the prospect of irreparable harm to sacred
lands and centuries-old religious traditions that would occur absent in-
junctive relief."3 82 Finally, protection of landmarks like the Bluffs and
the traditional practices tied to them, which was "consistent with expres-
sions of public policy such as the RFRA and the NHPA," was not contra-
ry to the public interest.38 3 The court consequently issued a preliminary
injunction against any further construction-related activities at the site.384
Faced with the court's finding that the Comanche Nation was likely
to succeed on the merits of its claims, Fort Sill officials decided to aban-
don the warehouse plan.3 85 The Comanche Nation's effort to protect the
Medicine Bluffs viewscape thus met with far greater success than did
similar efforts by tribes whose efforts were blocked by the Ninth Cir-
cuit's cramped approach to identifying substantial burdens on religious
exercise in RFRA claims.
380. Id. at *18. The court reached the same conclusion as to the tribe's claim that the defend-
ants had failed to comply with the NHPA. They virtually ignored the viewscape concerns, which
were even raised by the director of the Fort Sill Museum prior to the sending out of the Section 106
notice letter, and sent out a letter that buried the details of the project in technical attachments and
lacked the detailed disclosure and information required by the Section 106 regulations. Moreover,
the requirement that there be good faith consultation indicated that the tribes should have been told
that the warehouse project was just "the tip of the iceberg," given that there were plans for further
construction; proper disclosure would have apprised the tribes of the cumulative impact of the Ar-
my's planned construction in the area. The NHPA requires an agency to "stop, look, and listen"
before proceeding with a project, but the defendants had "merely paused, glanced, and turned a deaf
ear to warnings of adverse impact," thus falling short of "the reasonable and good faith efforts re-
quired by the law." Id. at *19 (quoting Coliseum Square Ass'n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 225 (5th
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
381. Id. at *2.
382. Id. at *19.
383. Id at *17.
384. Id
385. Nolan Clay, Comanche Nation Successfully Argued That Medicine Bluff Area Is Sacred;
Army Loses $650K, OKLAHoMAN, Oct. 28, 2009, at Al (noting the Army's decision to suspend
plans to build the warehouse and the request to the district court that the case consequently be dis-
missed).
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3. The Impact of Lyng
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected Lyng as control-
ling the case for two reasons. First, the challenge in Lyng was brought
directly under the Free Exercise Clause, which has a less demanding
standard that must be satisfied to justify a burden than does RFRA. Sec-
ond, the facts of the two cases were materially different. Whereas the
Supreme Court in Lyng saw no basis for distinguishing the plaintiffs'
claim from one that would require exclusion of non-Indians, the tribes in
Navajo Nation did not seek to prevent use of the San Francisco Peaks by
others.38 6 The court concluded with a telling observation:
The Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise claim in part because
it could not see a stopping place. We uphold the RFRA claim in this
case in part because otherwise we cannot see a starting place. If Ap-
pellants do not have a valid RFRA claim in this case, we are unable
to see how any Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful
RFRA claim based on beliefs and practices tied to land that they hold
sacred. 387
Sitting en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit saw Lyng as being on
point and supporting the court's decision. 388 The court raised Lyng-like
policy concerns about the impact of concluding that the plaintiffs' reli-
gious exercise had been substantially burdened: "[A]ny action the federal
government were to take ... would be subject to the personalized over-
sight of millions of citizens." 389 In 2006, in Gonzales, however, the Su-
preme Court rejected a similar slippery-slope argument, dismissing the
Government's argument that making one exemption would lead to end-
less demands for others as "the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats through-
out history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for
everybody, so no exceptions."390
4. The Role of the Establishment Clause
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected an argument
made by Snowbowl that complying with the Establishment Clause was
391an additional compelling interest furthered by the USFS decision.
"Declining to allow a commercial ski resort in a national forest to put
386. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007).
387. Id at 1048. In addition to holding that the plaintiffs prevailed on their RFRA claim, the
court reversed the district court decision as to one NEPA claim (holding that the Environmental
Impact Statement prepared for the project did not satisfy NEPA with respect to the possible risks
from ingestion of the artificial snow) but upheld the decision as to four other NEPA claims. Id. at
1048-59. The court also upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on
the Hopi Tribe's claim of lack of proper consultation under the NHPA. Id. at 1059-60.
388. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071-73 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
389. Id. at 1063.
390. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36
(2006).
391. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1044-46.
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treated sewage effluent on a sacred mountain," the court explained, "falls
far short of an Establishment Clause violation" and "is a permitted ac-
commodation to avoid 'callous indifference' [to religious interests]."392
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, the Ninth Circuit considered, and re-
jected, Puget's objection to the increased water flow for May and June
required in FERC's revised order. Although Puget's objection was not
explicitly based on the Establishment Clause at this stage, it still impli-
cated religious exercise. The court concluded that because FERC found
that a greater amount of water flow during these months would produce a
greater amount of mist, which is important to the Snoqualmie Tribe's
religious practice, FERC could reasonably conclude that increasing those
months' minimum-flow requirement "would augment the Tribe's reli-
gious experience and result in a better balance of interests" under § 10 of
the FPA.393 The court noted further that FERC had "carefully weighed"
the impact on the religious experience of the tribe of the decision to re-
quire increased water flows against the decision's financial impact on
Puget.394 This aspect of the opinion indicates how other statutes may
provide a basis for respect for, and accommodation of, tribal religious
rights, in the face of hostility toward tribal rights under RFRA. The bal-
ancing of interests called for by the FPA prompted FERC to increase the
water-flow requirements for May and June (to the consternation of Pu-
get) for the purpose of increasing religiously significant mist during
those months. Although the FPA's balancing of interests approach does
not put religious needs front and center as does RFRA, and the FPA's
reach is limited to the energy industry, it can still serve as a means for
tribal religious concerns to be taken into account in this setting.
III. CONFRONTING THE (FR)ENEMY: ADDRESSING THE UNFINISHED
BUSINESS OF PROTECTING (AMERICAN INDIAN) RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
One thing to remember is the people that came to this country from
other countries came here to have religious freedom, and I can't see
these same people denying us the freedom that we enjoyed before
they came.395
What conclusions can be drawn from the above examination of liti-
gation involving Indian religious exercise at sacred sites on public lands
and the roles of the Establishment Clause and RFRA in this context?
Two conclusions leap to mind: first, the government is not a consistent
392. Id at 1046 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 673, 673 (1984)).
393. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2008).
394. Id. Because Puget's briefs did not raise the Establishment Clause objection to the Rehear-
ing Order that it had raised in the FERC proceedings, the court did not address it. See supra note 276
and accompanying text; see also Puget Sound Energy, Inc.'s Reply Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe,
545 F.3d 1207 (Nos. 05-72739, 05-74060), 2006 WL 5022050.
395. AIRFA Hearings, supra note 31, at 83 (statement of Frank Tenario, All Indian Pueblo
Council).
2012] 411
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
friend of Indian religious freedom and, second, the Government always
wins (or at least almost always wins). To put it another way, the govern-
ment's schizophrenic conduct toward Indian religious exercise creates
suspicion that it is, in modern parlance, a "frenemy"-an enemy dis-
guised as a friend, who cannot be counted on to act in accordance with
its own promises of respect and protection. From this perspective, the
conduct of the federal Government vis-A-vis Indian religious exercise
claims, and federal courts' response thereto, appears to come down to a
simple rule: Indian free exercise rights matter when the government de-
cides they do; otherwise, they do not. Indian religious freedom is pro-
tected only as a result of a kind of noblesse oblige.
If viewed in this way, the government's attitude toward Indian reli-
gions appears to have come full circle. Under explicit policies of an ear-
lier era, traditional Indian beliefs and practices were deemed barbaric and
classified as "Indian Offenses."396 Christianity was favored and promoted
as a crucial element of the process of "civilizing" the Indians. 3 97 This
policy was formally repudiated, as reflected in AIRFA and other statutes
and in executive actions.398 In practice, however, engaging in traditional
ceremonies and other forms of religious exercise, even if not explicitly
forbidden, may be protected on lands subject to federal government deci-
sion-making power only when land managers decide that such protection
is not contrary to federal goals and therefore deign to provide it. Once
again, Indian religious freedom may be subordinated to other federal
policies. Moreover, the contours of these policies continue to be shaped
by the demands of non-Indians to be able to enjoy and profit from land
and other resources taken in the past from tribes, even if their enjoyment
infringes on Indian religious beliefs and practices. Multiple use mandates
for what is today public land and policies that favor commercial resource
exploitation have become mechanisms for denying protection for reli-
gious uses of land in favor of recreational and commercial uses.
Further reflection on the cases explored in Parts I and II is neces-
sary, however, to develop a better understanding of what they reveal
about "who or what the threats to [Indian] religious freedom are" 399 and,
in turn, to formulate strategies for achieving the level of protection prom-
ised by the First Amendment, AIRFA, RFRA, and the Sacred Sites Or-
der, as well as by the recently endorsed United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.4 0 0 The first step is to look back to the
cases that not only provide the backdrop for contemporary sacred sites
claims but also continue to influence land managers' and courts' ap-
proaches to these claims: Lyng and Smith. Secondly, RFRA and its role
396. Dussias, supra note 22, at 788-89.
397. Id. at 776-87.
398. See supra notes 30-40, 48-49, 55-57, 63-66 and accompanying text.
399. Smith, supra note 20, at 2034.
400. See infra notes 462-69 and accompanying text.
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as a potential antidote for Smith where sacred sites are concerned should
be examined. Part III.D offers preliminary thoughts on moving toward
greater protection of religious exercise on public lands-stressing the
need for tribal input-in keeping with the political and trust relationships
between tribes and the United States.
A. Lyng: Sword or Shield?
The cases examined in Parts I and II reveal the continuing im-
portance of a case that predates RFRA by fifteen years: Lyng. These cas-
es reveal the two alternative functions that Lyng plays in litigation over
Indian religious exercise on public lands-justification for accommoda-
tion or excuse for infringement (or for denying that infringement has
occurred). The first function of Lyng has been embraced by federal land
managers in making decisions that protect religious exercise and by
Government attorneys and courts (in litigation) as evidence of the
Court's endorsement and encouragement of such protection as constitu-
tionally permissible. This accommodation principle is embodied in fed-
eral legislation and Executive Branch orders and actions. In short, there
is ample support for the continuing vitality of this aspect of Lyng.
The continuing force of the second aspect of Lyng, which has been
used as an excuse for actions that are so injurious as to desecrate a sacred
site or to threaten to destroy a religion, even after the enactment of
RFRA, is puzzling. As Justice Scalia recognized in Smith when refusing
to apply strict scrutiny, Lyng, along with Roy, proved to be, in essence,
the run up to Smith.40 1 Just as the majority of the Court declined to apply
the compelling interest test to protect Indian religious exercise in Smith,
the majority failed to do so in Lyng. Noting this history in its brief in
Navajo Nation, the Government observed that the Court's approach in
Lyng was "consistent with the line of cases leading to the Court's deci-
sion in Smith and the subsequent passage of RFRA."402 In other words,
Lyng was one of a pair of cases that led to Smith, which Congress repu-
diated in RFRA.
Lyng did not receive the same national attention that Smith later re-
ceived when it was decided. Lyng involved a scenario (a threat to a sa-
cred site on public land) that did not resonate with adherents of main-
stream religions. Before Smith, Lyng, along with Roy, could have been
dismissed as "odd ball" cases impacting only Indians. Smith's determina-
tion that the compelling interest test would no longer be applied to any
burdens imposed on religion by neutral laws of general applicability, on
401. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 269, 279 (2012) (noting that "[tihe Smith Court interpreted both [Roy] and Lyng as not
having used the strict scrutiny test"). As Professor Skibine explains, there are difficulties in interpret-
ing Lyng and its impact in the RFRA context. Id. at 279-82.
402. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 27.
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the other hand, was recognized as a threat to all religions, not just to
those with vulnerable sacred sites located on public lands. As an evangel-
ical Christian minister stated candidly in testimony to the House of Rep-
resentatives prior to the enactment of RFRA, if all that the Court had
done in Smith was to deny Free Exercise Clause protection to Indian reli-
gious practices, "we wouldn't be here today." 40 3 Non-Indians paid so
much attention to the Court's decision to, "without benefit of briefing or
argument, discard[] decades of precedent and announce[] a sea change in
first amendment law[]" in Smith because it meant that their "ability to put
[their] faith into action [was] now totally subject to majoritarian rule." 40
In other words, Smith mattered in a way that Lyng had not because non-
Indian religious practitioners were now to be treated like their Indian
counterparts.
Given Lyng's ties to the decision in Smith to abandon the compel-
ling interest test except in rare instances, it should follow that RFRA
reinstated the compelling interest test to scenarios like the threat to a
sacred site in Lyng. After all, the language of RFRA states Congress's
intent to restore the test that Smith abandoned. Congress noted in RFRA
that the Smith decision "virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neu-
tral toward religion" and praised "the compelling interest test as set forth
in prior Federal court rulings," which the statute was intended to re-
store.405 The process of abandonment of the compelling interest test in
Indian religious freedom cases did not begin with Smith but rather with
Lyng and Roy. Nowhere in RFRA did Congress state that the compelling
interest test should not be reinstated in cases where Indian religious free-
dom was at stake.
In arguing to the Ninth Circuit in Snoqualmie Indian Tribe that
Lyng defeated the tribe's claim, however, FERC argued that "pre-Smith
case law, including Lyng, remains intact"406 after the enactment of
RFRA. FERC quoted a statement made by one legislator:
RFRA does not [a]ffect Lyng ... because the incidental impact on
a religious practice does not constitute a cognizable burden on any-
one's free exercise of religion. In Lyng, the court ruled that the way
in which Government manages its affairs and uses its own property
403. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the H.R. Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 38 (1990)
(statement of Rev. Robert P. Dugan, Jr., Dir., Office of Public Affairs, Nat'l Ass'n of Evangelicals).
Reverend Dugan testified in the hearings on the initial predecessor to the bill that was ultimately
enacted, in revised form, as RFRA in 1993.
404. Id. at 41-42. For a legislative history of the enactment of RFRA, see generally Robert F.
Drinan & Jennifer 1. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.
L. & RELIGION 531 passim (1994).
405. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(5), (b)(1) (2006),
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
406. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 30.
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does not constitute a burden on religious exercise. Thus, the construc-
tion of mining or timber roads over Government land, land sacred to
[N]ative American religion, did not burden their free exercise rights.
Unless a burden is demonstrated, there can be no free exercise viola-
-407tion.
The statement that Lyng is unaffected by RFRA because incidental im-
pacts on religious practice do not constitute cognizable burdens is, how-
ever, at odds with RFRA's recognition that neutral, incidental impacts
can be just as burdensome as intentional interference with religious exer-
cise and thus should be subject to compelling interest scrutiny. Moreo-
ver, Lyng recognized that the impact on Indian religion from the pro-
posed road construction and timber harvesting might well be severe-in
RFRA parlance, might well constitute a substantial burden. The Court
held that regardless of such an impact, the Government did not have to
meet the compelling interest test.40 8 In other words, the Lyng Court did
not apply the compelling interest test because the adverse impact on reli-
gious practice stemmed from the incidental effects of a government land
use decision. The Government was not deliberately discriminating
against "religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred."409 RFRA,
on the other hand, established that a government action with a significant
adverse impact on religious practice is not shielded from application of
the compelling interest test because such an impact was unintended.
Moreover, RFRA contains no carveout for land use decisions. In-
deed, in the oral arguments in Navajo Nation, the Government's attorney
acknowledged that RFRA does apply to land use decisions with inci-
dental impacts on religious exercise.4 10 Certainly the National Historic
Preservation Act, as well as National Environmental Policy Act, also
make clear Congress's longstanding understanding that tribes are legally
entitled to a role in decision making as to public lands in which they hold
cultural and religious interests.4 11
Two additional points about Lyng's reasoning and legacy are in or-
der. In addition to relying on the concept that incidental burdens imposed
on religious exercise are not subject to compelling interest scrutiny to
support the outcome in the case, the majority also relied on an expanded
understanding of the Government's property rights and the privileging of
these rights over religious exercise rights. Professor Kristen Carpenter
407. Id. at 31 (first alteration in original) (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S14,461, S14,470 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson)) (internal quotation mark omitted). FERC also
cited 139 CONG. REC. S14,461, S14,470 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
408. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988).
409. Id. at 453.
410. Oral Argument at 34:55, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. 3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (Nos. 06-15371, 06-15436, 06-15455), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pkid=000000 1352.
411. See SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 22-24 (NHPA requirements); id. at 62-64
(N EPA requirements).
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has written convincingly about the flaws in this approach.4 12 In addition,
in Establishment Clause challenges to management plans, the Govern-
ment itself has acknowledged the responsibility that the taking of sacred
Indian land imposes upon land managers.4 13 This acknowledgment
amounts to a rejection of the argument that government property rights
automatically trump tribal religious rights.
Finally, the Lyng majority also argued that AIRFA was legally im-
potent as an additional basis for denying the plaintiffs relief. The majori-
ty opinion downplayed the statute's significance by quoting a statement
by one of its sponsors, Representative Morris Udall, that it "has no teeth
in it."414 Examination of the context for this statement, however, reveals
that it was not offered as a broad pronouncement indicating that AIRFA
lacked legal significance. Rather, Representative Udall voiced these
words in response to a colleague's concerns that AJIRFA would apply to
private land.4 15 He sought to ease the minds of House members who, at a
time when "we have [American] Indians marching on the Capitol,"
feared that Congress was "rushing a little bit fast" and taking an action
that could "disrupt the normal progress of America" by enacting
AIRFA.416 Representative Theodore Risenhoover also responded by ex-
pressing surprise that "we would in any way question the right of a group
of people to exercise their freedom of belief' and explained that AIRFA
"assure[s] the Indian people the right to practice their religion on ...
Federal property."4
In short, there are a number of reasons to conclude that Lyng can no
longer serve as a precedent supporting the argument that the government
need not comply with the compelling interest test as to actions that bur-
den religious exercise. At the same time, there is no reason to believe
that the aspect of Lyng that calls for government accommodation of reli-
gious exercise has lost its force. Rather, it has been strengthened by post-
Lyng developments.
412. See Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a
Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062-67 (2005). Professor Carpenter
highlighted the social relations view of property rights, which conceives of property as "a set of
'social relations' among persons with respect to things," as an alternative to the ownership model of
property rights. Id at 1088. She explored how, in the sacred sites context, common law property
rights for Indians grow out of the relationships between (1) the federal government and Indian na-
tions, under federal Indian law principles; (2) the federal government and individual citizens, under
the public trust doctrine; and (3) the United States and indigenous peoples within its borders, under
international human rights law. Id. at 1100-38. For a discussion of courts' privileging of government
property rights, see Dussias, supra note 22, at 819-33.
413. See supra notes 136, 160-61 and accompanying text.
414. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1988) (quoting
124 CONG. REC. 21,444-21,445 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
415. 124 CONG. REC. 21,443, 21,445 (1978) (noting that AIRFA "has nothing whatever to do
with private property" and that it "addresses property that is all federally owned").
416. Id (statement of Rep. Robert Badhamn).
417. Id at 21,446 (statement of Rep. Theodore Risenhoover).
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B. Smith: Repudiated by Congress but Still Potent
In Smith, just as in Lyng, Indian religious freedom claims provided
the occasion for limiting Free Exercise Clause protection against gov-
ernment action that threatened religious beliefs and practices. The Court
sidestepped evaluating the claims in these cases, whether involving (as in
Smith) a denial of government benefits rooted in religious conduct (sac-
ramental ingestion of a controlled substance) or (as in Lyng) interference
with worship at a sacred site on public lands by a land management deci-
sion designed to facilitate commercial use. In Smith, neither side had
argued that the compelling interest test did not apply, yet the majority
opinion reflected five Justices' decision that the Court should hold that it
did not. Given the difficulty that Indian claimants have had in persuading
courts to address their claims under RFRA's test, Smith's abandonment
of the compelling interest test continues to adversely impact Indians.
1. Smith and Hybrid Rights
In Smith, in trying to explain why the Court applied the compelling
interest test in cases like Yoder but now refused to do so in Smith, the
majority described these cases as involving "hybrid situation[s] .418 Not
only were free exercise rights at stake but so were other important rights,
such as parents' rights to direct the upbringing of their children.419 Pro-
fessor Michael McConnell has noted, however, that Smith itself could
have been considered a hybrid rights case that combined free speech
rights and free exercise rights: "Smith and Black could have made a col-
orable claim under the Free Speech Clause that the prohibition of peyote
use interfered with their ability to communicate [a] message," namely
their "faith in the tenets of the Native American Church."4 2 0 Indian
claims couched in Free Exercise Clause language can also implicate
rights to freedom of association.
In the case of Indian religious practices, one can argue that other rights,
in addition to speech and association rights, are also at stake, such as the
right of tribes to have their sovereignty respected, as well as rights flow-
ing from the trust relationship between tribes and the United States. The
Smith Court referred to the supposed hybrid rights cases as involving the
coupling of the Free Exercise Clause with other constitutional protec-
tions.421 Because the federal-tribal relationship also has a constitutional
418. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
419. Id. at 881.
420. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1109, 1122 (1990). The author concludes that the reason why the Smith plaintiffs' free speech
claim would not prevail as a hybrid with their free exercise claim, "a legal realist would tell us, is
that the Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid' claims was not intended to be taken seriously." Id.
421. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-
ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections . . . .").
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basis, tribal religious rights claims can be understood as hybrid rights
claims. Indeed, the Government cited its obligations pursuant to tribal
rights as secular purposes underlying management plans at Rainbow
Bridge National Monument and other public lands. Consequently, under
the Smith hybrid rights doctrine, government actions that burden Indian
religious exercise arguably are subject to compelling interest scrutiny
even post-Smith, without need for consideration of RFRA, on the theory
that they burden hybrid rights.
The application of the pre-Smith compelling interest test to burdens
on Indian religious freedom does not, of course, ensure protection for
religious practitioners. A court may well conclude that government inter-
ests outweigh religious exercise rights, as courts concluded in pre-Smith
sacred sites cases like Badoni.422 If strict scrutiny is applied, though,
there is at least a possibility that courts will vindicate Indian free exercise
rights on the basis of the government's failure to satisfy the compelling
interest test. Moreover, the prospect of having to meet the test could en-
courage land managers to make decisions that are more solicitous of In-
dian religious freedom.
2. The Impact of Smith on Claim Filing and Minority Religions
A 2004 study of free exercise claims during the period between the
Smith decision and the enactment of RFRA concluded that far fewer free
exercise cases were brought, with the rate of cases brought by religious
groups dropping by over 50% immediately after the decision. Moreover,
the number of rulings in favor of the plaintiffs dropped significantly.4 23
When Smith was decided, closing the courts to most free exercise
claimants logically could have been expected to have a greater impact on
minority religions because of their greater need to rely on the judicial
process for free exercise protection. The 2004 study, for example, found
that between 1981 and 1997, minority religions combined accounted for
nearly 62% of free exercise cases, while making up only 18% of U.S.
religious membership.424 It stands to reason that minority religions will
have greater need to turn to the courts to challenge government actions
than will mainstream religions whose needs and values are likely to have
shaped the drafting of laws and various government decisions in the first
place. In other words, because "the majority of Americans adhere to
mainstream religious groups, . . . laws of general applicability are likely
422. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 647 (D. Utah 1977), af'd, 638 F.2d 172,
177 (10th Cir. 1980). The Tenth Circuit concluded in Badoni that the Government's interests out-
weighed plaintiffs' interests. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
423. Amy Adamczyk et al., Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of
Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 242 (2004). The authors determined that the percentage
of favorable decisions dropped from 39% before Smith to less than 29% between Smith and the
enactment of RFRA. Id at 248.
424. Id. at 245-46.
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to be consistent with mainstream religious beliefs."425 Such laws "are
developed on the bases of majority norms, values, and beliefs."42 6 To the
Smith majority, this was not a concern, and effectively closing the courts
to those most in need of access, and instead sending them to beg for leg-
islative protection, was deemed acceptable. Discouraging practitioners of
minority religions whose free exercise rights were burdened by laws of
allegedly neutral laws of general applicability from going to court also
meant that courts (and the rest of society) would not readily become
427aware of the impact of these laws on such practitioners.
3. Smith and the Tyranny of the Majority
Justice Jackson wrote in 1943 that
[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as le-
gal principles to be applied by courts. One's right to ... freedom of
worship ... and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.428
The Smith Court's endorsement of putting the free exercise rights of mi-
nority religious practitioners to a vote, by abandoning them to the politi-
cal process, conflicts with this understanding of the Bill of Rights.
Representative Glenn Anderson raised concern about this develop-
ment in Congress in 1991, observing that "against all original intent of
the Founding Fathers and the history of American law, Smith allows ma-
jorities to trample on individual religious freedoms without any recourse
to the courts for constitutional protection." 2 9 Representative Anderson
noted further that the Court's "illogical refusal to examine any State in-
fringements on religious practices is disastrous to those religious practic-
es which may not conform to general law and do not have the popular
support to find politically granted exceptions." 430 This refusal could
mean that "the drinking of sacramental wine may be forbidden to minors
because of State age-related liquor laws," although this seemed unlikely
"due to our society's majority Judeo-Christian composition." 31 Justice
Blackmun observed in his dissent in Smith that the use of peyote as a
sacrament by the Native American Church is "closely analogous to the
sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic Church."432 Although
425. Id at 253.
426. Id
427. Id at 251.
428. W. Va. State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
429. 137 CONG. REc. 23,376 (1991) (statement of Rep. Glenn Anderson) (italics added) [here-
inafter Rep. Anderson Remarks].
430. Id.
431. Id,
432. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 n.6 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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this analogy is helpful in understanding the impact of Smith, it is worth
noting that the comparison between forbidding communion wine to chil-
dren and forbidding peyote to Native American Church members is not a
perfect one and understates the significance of a peyote prohibition. For
Roman Catholics, for example, consumption of eucharistic bread (the
communion wafer, or host) alone suffices for receiving communion,
whereas for Native American Church members, peyote is the only sub-
stance that is sacramentally consumed.433 Prohibiting peyote means
denying access to a sacrament entirely.
Moreover, Smith's relegation of religious freedom protection to the
political process meant primarily relegation to the state political process.
In other words, rejecting a judicial role in balancing rights under the
compelling interest test means that the courts leave individuals at the
mercy of state governments, even though, as Representative Anderson
observed, history has "unequivocally demonstrated that it is States which
are the greatest trespassers of our constitutional rights, not the greatest
protectors."43 4 Rather than respecting individual rights, states have sacri-
ficed "the rights of individuals, often poor and powerless, in haste to
please the demands of either the powerful or the many."435 It was in part
this unwillingness to protect individual rights that necessitated adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.436
By leaving the protection of the free exercise rights of adherents of
minority religions to governments that can be expected to act based on
political expediency, the Court abandoned the Judicial Branch's crucial
protective role where constitutional rights are at stake. In the view of
James Madison, the courts were to serve as "an impenetrable bulwark" in
defense of constitutional rights.437 Smith amounted to a statement by five
Supreme Court Justices that they no longer cared to play this role where
merely religious liberty was at stake. Only if other fundamental rights
were at stake, perhaps in conjunction with free exercise rights, would the
Court be willing to put forth the effort to review government actions for
their compliance with the First Amendment.
433. According to Roman Catholic teachings, because Christ is sacramentally present in both
the consecrated bread and the wine, ingestion of either alone constitutes receipt of communion.
434. Rep. Anderson Remarks, supra note 429, at 23,376.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Madison stated, "[I]ndependent tribunals of justice . .. will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of




C. RFRA: Restoration of Whose Religious Freedom?
1. RFRA and Majority Religions
Following Smith, Congress enacted an amendment to AIRFA to
protect sacramental peyote use by members of federally recognized
tribes against federal and state prohibitions.438 This development sug-
gested that appeals to Congress for religious exercise protection are not
always doomed to fall on deaf ears. RFRA, enacted the year before the
AIRFA peyote amendment, might also be hailed as evidence of the abil-
ity of the political branches of government-at least at the federal lev-
el-to recognize the needs of practitioners of Native American religions
and other minority religions for protection against substantial burdens on
their religious exercise. It is interesting, then, to note the dominance of
representatives of mainstream religions in the push to enact RFRA (and
to shape its language to meet their concerns). Moreover, their involve-
ment did not necessarily arise from an ecumenical spirit but perhaps
more from concerns over the threat that Smith might pose to their own
beliefs and practices. Indian religious practitioners pointed out the inade-
quacy of RFRA in written submissions to Congress, whereas the con-
gressional hearings that ultimately led to enactment of RFRA focused,
for the most part, on testimony from representatives of mainstream reli-
gions. RFRA itself was thus largely shaped by majority, rather than mi-
nority, voices and concerns.
The 1992 Senate hearing, for example, included testimony from
representatives of four Christian denominations, one of whom also testi-
fied on behalf of the American Jewish Congress.43 Only one member of
a minority religion, a Laotian immigrant who spoke about Hmong tradi-
tional religious beliefs, took part in the hearing.440 No practitioner of a
traditional Indian religion testified in the hearing, although a statement
by a coalition of Indian tribes and organizations was submitted.44' The
statement noted Indian support for the RFRA bill because "it is vitally
important to restore to all Americans the basic First Amendment free-
doms which have been stripped from them by recent Supreme Court de-
cisions," but also stressed the need for separate legislation to protect In-
dian religious freedom. Additional legislation was needed if Indians "are
438. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006). The amendment provid-
ed that "the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional cere-
monial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall
not be prohibited by the United States or any State." § 1996a(b)(1). The provision applies only to
individuals who fit within the statute's definition of "Indian," namely a member of a federally rec-
ognized tribe. § 1996(a)(c)(1), (2).
439. 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at iii (listing witnesses and their affiliations);
id at 29 (noting that witness Oliver Thomas was testifying on behalf of both the Baptist Joint Com-
mittee and the American Jewish Congress).
440. Id. at 5-6 (noting statement of William Nouyi Yang).
441. Id. at 243. The statement was submitted by "a broad coalition of Indian tribes and organi-
zations and religious, civil rights and environmental organizations." Id at 244.
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to receive the same degree of protection of their religious practices as
that accorded other religious traditions."4 2 Although separate legislation
was passed with regard to sacramental use of peyote, efforts to enact
sacred sites-related protection were met with failure.4 3
2. RFRA, Equality, and Neutrality
Much has been written about the differences between the religions
of the indigenous peoples of the United States and Christianity.4" At the
same time, there are similarities between Indian religions and main-
stream religions like Christianity. There are beliefs and practices of Indi-
an religions that in some way correspond in function or at least in im-
portance with, while differing in form from, Christian beliefs and prac-
tices. Indian Free Exercise Clause claimants made this point (albeit with
little success) in pre-Lyng and pre-Smith cases, in which they analogized
between their beliefs and practices and those of Christianity, to try to
dispel ignorance of Indian religions and make the point that the Govern-
ment was infringing upon their religious freedom.445
To the extent that Indian religious beliefs and practices have coun-
terparts, in terms of such characteristics as function and significance,
with those of the predominant American religion of Christianity, then the
failure to protect the former while protecting the latter raises the question
of whether this approach amounts to a kind of religious preferentialism
that past Supreme Court cases have rejected.446 We might well ask how
legal protection of Christian beliefs and practices through legislative,
executive, and judicial actions, while Indian religious beliefs and practic-
es of comparable function and significance to their practitioners are not
similarly protected, can be reconciled with the principle of neutrality, one
of the Establishment Clause's underlying values. How can this disparate
treatment be understood as anything other than the kind of denomina-
tional preference that Congress also rejected in its most recent religious
freedom-related enactment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA)? Enacted in 2000, RLUIPA, which requires all
governments to meet the compelling interest test in order to impose sub-
442. Id.
443. See, e.g., Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal,
Historical, and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion
Act, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 373, 384-88 (1993) (discussing efforts to enact legislation
to protect sacred sites, as well as sacramental use of peyote and other religious rights). A bill entitled
the "Native American Sacred Lands Act," for example, was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in 2002 and again in 2003 but was not enacted. H.R. 5155, 107th Cong. (July 18, 2002); H.R.
2419, 108th Cong. (June 11, 2003). The Senate bill that was ultimately enacted as the Native Ameri-
can Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993 originally included provisions to protect sacred sites. S.
1021, 103d Cong. tit. I (May 25, 1993). Only the peyote-related provisions were enacted.
444. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 22, at 811-15.
445. See, e.g., id. at 815-19.
446. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (stating that federal and state
governments cannot "prefer one religion over another"). In recent years, the neutrality principle has
played a particularly strong role where government funding is at issue.
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stantial burdens on religious exercise through land use regulation, pro-
hibits governments from imposing or implementing a land use regulation
that discriminates on the basis of religion or religious denomination.m
Focusing on sacred sites cases in particular, if RFRA is interpreted
and applied in litigation in a way that does not adequately protect Indian
sacred sites in most instances, this application of the statute raises the
question of why a category of claims is excluded, in effect, from protec-
tion under RFRA. Are sacred sites claims not within the purview of
RFRA because Indian rights do not matter? The judges who dissented
from the Navajo Nation en banc decision touched on this problem, ob-
serving that the majority's application of RFRA "effectively read Ameri-
can Indians out of RFRA.""8 The tribal coalition statement submitted to
Congress in the 1992 RFRA hearings also noted that courts have been
"perplexed" in applying the compelling interest test to sacred sites cases
and that there is a "need to ensure that the 'compelling state interest' test
is refined and made to more adequately 'fit' [Indian] religions."" 9 Put-
ting this question in terms of RFRA's substantial burden concept, Are
burdens attributable to incidental impacts on sacred sites on public lands
not "cognizable" because only Indians are so burdened? Clearly such an
exclusion is not apparent in the text of RFRA.
The comments above focus on the abandonment of neutrality that is
embodied in legal protection for Christian, but not Indian, beliefs and
practices. Neutrality needs to be considered in another way as well. Re-
spect for the neutrality principle justifies sacred sites protection extended
by federal land managers. If Christian beliefs and practices are already
protected, then efforts aimed at protecting Indian religious exercise are
neutral as between religions. In other words, actions that accommodate
Indian religious beliefs and practice are not "special treatment." Rather,
they are neutral as between religions if they attempt to provide the same
level of protection to Indian religions that is provided to Christian de-
447. RLUIPA provides as follows:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes
a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly
or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). "'[R]eligious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). "Land use regula-
tion" is defined to include zoning and landmarking laws, and their application, that limit or restrict
land use or development. § 2000cc-5(5). The denominational non-discrimination provision states
that "[n]o govemment shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any
assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination." § 2000cc(b)(2). Addi-
tional sections provide protection for religious exercise by institutionalized persons. § 2000cc-l(a).
The Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause-based facial challenge to RLUIPA's institu-
tionalized persons provisions in 2005. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005).
448. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
449. 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 257.
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nominations. Consequently, measures designed to protect Indian reli-
gious practitioners' exercise of their religion do not run afoul of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Rather, they are consistent with the substantive neu-
trality that Congress embraced in RFRA. 4 50
Finally, the neutrality principle can be understood as playing yet
another role in this context: as support for religious practitioners arguing
that a government action has substantially burdened their religious exer-
cise and is indefensible under RFRA's compelling interest test. Defini-
tions like those employed by the Ninth Circuit to define "substantial bur-
den" rely on cases involving burdens on Christian religious practitioners.
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court focused on the coercive and
potentially punitive impacts of the government actions in question on
members of particular Christian denominations. If government actions,
however characterized and whatever their form, have as significant an
adverse impact on Indian religious practitioners as the challenged actions
did on Christians in Sherbert and Yoder, then the neutrality principle
requires recognition that such actions impose substantial burdens. In oth-
er words, if the compelling interest test is triggered by seriously adverse
impacts on Christian religious exercise, then negative impacts of similar
magnitude on Indian religious exercise should also trigger application of
the test. If they do not, then Christianity is receiving a form of preferen-
tial treatment that is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
D. Now What? Envisioning a Path Toward Equalizing Protection ofIn-
dian Religions
Part I demonstrated the impact that federal land managers who take
seriously their responsibilities to protect Indian religious exercise can
have in promoting Indian religious freedom, particularly given the Gov-
ernment's vigorous (and successful) defense of land managers' decisions
against Establishment Clause challenges. Part II demonstrated that if land
managers instead privilege other interests over Indian religious exercise
rights, then efforts to protect religious exercise at sacred sites through
RFRA may face an uphill battle, particularly in courts in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Taken together, Parts I and II teach the importance of effective trib-
al involvement in the development and implementation of management
plans related to public lands that contain sacred sites. Optimizing oppor-
tunities for meaningful tribal involvement thus appears crucial.
Although an analysis of the current opportunities for tribal involve-
ment in the development of management plans by federal government
departments and agencies, and of their effectiveness for tribes, is beyond
the scope of this Article, a few general observations can be made. First,
450. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1994) (rejecting formal neutrality and
reenactment of substantive neutrality).
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assessing these opportunities and their effectiveness must start with
tribes' perceptions of their experiences. Recent and ongoing efforts of
federal agencies to evaluate and update their sacred sites and tribal con-
sultation policies have solicited tribal feedback, which needs to be inte-
grated into policy development and implementation.
The need to have public lands management plans better respond to
the expressed needs of Indian religious practitioners was highlighted in
the 1992 tribal statement submitted during the process of enacting
RFRA. The statement commented that "if our legal system is to serve all
segments of society, it should ensure that unique needs of indigenous
peoples are addressed and incorporated." 45 1 Because of the "contorted
approaches" that have been taken in trying to apply "concepts developed
with the Judeo-Christian tradition in mind to vastly different tribal reli-
gious practices," there is a need for "more specific criteria [to] be spelled
out" so that federal officials (and federal judges, if it comes to that) "can
understand and fairly apply the 'compelling state interest test' in the con-
text of America's unwritten and little understood indigenous reli-
gions."452 Furthermore, the statement explained, "[g]iven the long history
of government suppression of tribal religion and the federal trust rela-
tionship, Indians are entitled to specific standards and assurances" that
prevent federal actions from "infring[ing] unnecessarily on their right of
worship.AS3 Developing firmer and more informative guidelines for fed-
eral land managers to turn to in assessing sacred sites impacts is, then,
another important task. The damage done to Indian religious freedom by
the Navajo Nation en banc opinion's application of a narrow "substantial
burden" definition, which evidenced misunderstanding of Indian reli-
gions, underscores the urgency of carrying out this task.
In developing guidelines for identifying substantial burdens on reli-
gious exercise at sacred sites, RLUIPA may provide some guidance. Alt-
hough RLUIPA's land use provisions apply by their terms to zoning and
landmark actions, the statute contains the substantial burden concept. In
determining whether denial of permission to build is a substantial bur-
den, courts determine whether the claimant has other sites that are rea-
sonably available and are approved for its desired use.454 Some scholars
have suggested that the RFRA substantial burden inquiry should include
an evaluation of whether alternative means of exercising the religion in
question exist.4 55 In some sacred sites cases, the lack of any comparable
451. 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 257 58.
452. Id.
453. Id (emphasis added).
454. See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761-62
(7th Cir. 2003).
455. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925, 947 (2000) ("[C]ourts will be required to decide whether there exist ample
alternative means of satisfying the claimant's religious obligations."); Skibine, supra note 401, at
295.
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site, because of the uniqueness of the site at issue, would weigh in favor
of a finding that actions that adversely impact a site or interfere with its
use impose a substantial burden. In other cases, although another location
exists that is suitable for a particular ceremony or other activity (or for
gathering religiously significant materials), such location might be una-
vailable for the needed use, perhaps because it is located on private land
or is otherwise off limits. In such cases, too, a substantial burden exists
under this understanding of the term.
As tribal experiences are analyzed and more effective consultation
and protection guidelines are developed, it is important to keep in view
the connection between tribal religions and tribal sovereignty. Indian
religious exercise rights involve not just the rights of individuals but also
the rights of political entities, Indian tribes. The United States and tribes
have a sui generis, centuries-old, government-to-government relation-
ship. Inherent in this relationship is a trust obligation, rooted in treaties
by which tribes ceded land to the United States. As Professor Mary
Wood has explained, these treaties were "made against a framework of
federal promises which guaranteed native separatism and federal protec-
tion of the tribes' ability to continue their way of life."456 Discussing the
failure to understand the nature of religious activities at sacred sites re-
flected in the Lyng and en banc Navajo Nation opinions, Professor Alex
Skibine commented as follows:
The importance of sacred sites to Indian tribes and Native practition-
ers is less about individual spiritual development and more about the
continuing existence of Indians as a tribal people. The preservation of
these sites as well as tribal people's ability to practice their religion
there is intrinsically related to the survival of tribes as both cultural
and self-governing entities. 457
As federal officials consider their past and future treatment of Indian
religious exercise claims, they need to keep in mind the responsibilities
that they owe not just to individuals but also to tribes more broadly. Ful-
fillment of these responsibilities to tribes, as well as to individuals, must
take account of current tribes and individuals and those of generations to
come. In short, tribes, and the duties owed to them under the political and
trust relationships between tribes and the United States, must be front
and center when protection of tribal religious exercise is evaluated.
456. Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 109, 112
(1995).
457. Skibine, supra note 401, at 273-74. Professor Skibine noted further that the statements in
these opinions seemed to "equate Indians' religious exercises at sacred sites with Western yoga-like
practices.... [T]his view portrays Native religious activities at sacred sites as only about spiritual
peace of mind." Id. at 273. Although spiritual peace of mind is part of the practice, it "do[es] not go
to the heart of why these sacred places are important to Indian people or why management practices
like cutting down trees and spilling recycled sewage water on sacred land are extremely disturbing to
many Indian tribes." Id.
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The significance of the federal-tribal relationship in the protection
of sacred sites was appropriately highlighted in a 2006 U.S. Department
of Justice legal opinion. Commenting on the federal government's re-
sponsibilities under the Sacred Sites Order, the Department's Office of
Legal Counsel relied on the "special trust relationship between the feder-
al government and federally recognized Indian tribes"458 to argue that the
legal principles that prohibit the government from "enacting regulations
that prefer one religion over others, that foster excessive entanglement
with religion, or that lift privately imposed burdens ... do not apply to
regulations that accommodate the religious practices of' such tribes.459
Moreover, even if ordinary Establishment Clause principles are applied
to accommodations related to sacred sites, such principles must be ap-
plied with the federal-tribal relationship highlighted in Mancari in mind;
doing otherwise "is plainly incompatible with the federal government's
duty toward the tribes.A60 This special relationship "envisions active
assistance from the federal government" where religious exercise is con-
cerned.461
Finally, the recent endorsement by the United States of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 462
suggests that the time is ripe to review the compliance of the United
States with the developed and developing international law on the protec-
tion of indigenous peoples' religious rights in general and of sacred sites
in particular. Although the United States was one of the four nations that
voted against the adoption of UNDRIP in the U.N. General Assembly in
2007,463 President Obama announced the United States' changed stance
in December 2010.464 Article 11 of UNDRIP asserts the right of indige-
458. Permissible Accommodation of Sacred Sites, 20 Op. O.L.C. 331, 1996 WL 33101199, at
*5 (Sept. 18, 1996).
459. Id. at *3.
460. Id. at *5. The opinion noted that "in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court held that
preferences for federally recognized Indian tribes are subject to less exacting scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause than racial or ethnic preferences" because of the federal-tribal relationship.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
461. Id. at *5.
462. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter
UNDRIP].
463. Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples: A Historic
Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 539, 545 (2009). The other nations voting
against the adoption of UNDRIP (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) all changed their positions
on UNDRIP prior to the United States' change of position. Gail Courey Toensing, UN Declaration's
One-Year Anniversary: "Much to Celebrate, Much More to Be Done," INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
Dec. 12, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/12/12/un-declaration's-one-year-
anniversary-much-to-celebrate-much-more-to-be-done-66108.
464. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Remarks by the President at the Tribal Nations
Conference (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/12/05/remarks-president-tribal-nations-conference [hereinafter Obama UNDRIP Re-
marks]; see also President Barack Obama, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Initiatives to Promote the Government-to-
Government Relationship & Improve the Lives of Indigenous Peoples (Dec. 16, 2010),
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nous peoples "to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and cus-
toms," including "the right to maintain, protect and develop" manifesta-
tions of their cultures, such as historical sites and ceremonies.465 Article
12 sets out the right to "manifest, practise, develop and teach their spir-
itual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies" and to "maintain,
protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural
,,466sites. Article 25 asserts the right of indigenous peoples "to maintain
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their tradition-
ally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and
coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to
future generations in this regard." 4 67 More generally, UNDRIP provides
that indigenous peoples and individuals are to be free from discrimina-
tion in the exercise of their rights468 and that before governments adopt
and implement legislative or administrative measures that may affect
indigenous peoples, there must be consultation with their representative
institutions "to obtain their free, prior and informed consent." 4 69
Although non-binding on its face, UNDRIP stands as "an official
statement by most member countries of the United Nations that these are
the legal rights of indigenous peoples in international law" and thus has
"considerable political and moral force, creating the basis for it to be-
come binding international law."470 Some of UNDRIP's specific provi-
sions also reflect existing norms of customary international law.47 1
Moreover, UNDRIP as a whole is best understood as a document that
elaborates, "in the specific cultural, historical, social and economic cir-
cumstances of indigenous peoples," on already recognized "fundamental
human rights that are deemed of universal application."472
At the conclusion of a 2012 visit to the United States, U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples S. James Anaya noted that he had
"heard many stories about the significance of places that are sacred to
indigenous peoples, places like the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona and
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heritage is also protected by article 31, which sets out the "right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions." Id art.
31, |1.
466. Id art. 12, 1 1. Article 12(1) also protects "the right to use and control of ceremonial
objects." Id.
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the Black Hills in South Dakota, which hold profound religious and cul-
tural significance to tribes" and that "indigenous peoples reported . . .
that they have too little control over what happens in these places, and
that activities carried out around them at times affront their values and
beliefs.'A73 He concluded that continued efforts should be made "to re-
solve, clarify, and strengthen the protection of' sacred sites.474 The con-
cerns raised by the Special Rapporteur about U.S. sacred sites protection
are not without precedent in the U.N. system. In 2006, for example, the
U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed
concern about the impact of gold mining activities on Mount Tenabo in
Nevada, which is sacred to Western Shoshone tribes.475
Anaya highlighted U.S. support for UNDRIP as an important step
and commended the United States "for joining the rest of the countries of
the world in its support for this instrument." 4 76 Although he had heard
about federal initiatives that "can be seen as advances towards the im-
plementation of some provisions of the Declaration," it was "evident that
more robust measures are needed to address the serious issues affecting
Native American, Alaska Native and Hawaiian peoples in the United
States, issues that are rooted in a dark and complex history whose lega-
cies are not easy to overcome." 4 77 To conform to UNDRIP, "[c]ontinued
and concerted measures are needed to develop new initiatives and reform
existing ones, in consultation and in real partnership with indigenous
peoples." 7 8
Anaya's comments suggested the promise held out by the adoption
of UNDRIP, and by American support for it: "The Declaration provides
a new grounding for understanding the status and rights of indigenous
peoples, upon which the legal doctrines of conquest and discovery must
be discarded as a basis for decision-making by judicial and other authori-
ties."4 W In announcing the new support for UNDRIP, the State Depart-
ment asserted that "the United States is committed to serving as a model
in the international community in promoting and protecting the collective
473. Id.
474. Id.
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2006, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/DEC/l (Apr. 11, 2006). For a discussion of the experiences of the
Western Shoshone in the international arena and, more broadly, of the United States' tribal consulta-
tion obligations following the endorsement of UNDRIP, see Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Indigenous
Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation Policies in Light of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1301 passim (2011). The decision of the BLM to allow an
expansion of gold mining activities at Mount Tenabo is the subject of ongoing litigation in the Ninth
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rights of indigenous peoples"480 and highlighted the USDA's initiative to
review USFS policies and "to examine the effectiveness of existing laws
and regulations in ensuring a consistent level of sacred site protection
that is more acceptable to the tribes."4 8 1 If the United States is sincerely
committed to serving as a role model for protection of indigenous peo-
ples' collective rights-a commitment that would distance the nation
from past policies of conquest and cultural genocide-improving protec-
tion of sacred sites surely must be part of the commitment.
CONCLUSION
I encourage all Americans to reach deep inside to try to determine
what it is that drives their lives most deeply. . . . [L]et us never be-
lieve that the freedom of religion imposes on any of us some respon-
sibility to run from our.convictions. Let us instead respect one anoth-
er's faiths [and] fight to the death to preserve the right of every
American to practice whatever convictions he or she has ... .482
We know that, ultimately, this is not just a matter of legislation, not
just a matter of policy. It's a matter of whether we're going to live up
to our basic values. It's a matter of upholding an ideal that has always
defined who we are as Americans. 483
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court rejected a Free
Exercise Clause claim by members. of the Native American Church in a
way that was widely perceived as threatening the religious freedom of all
Americans. This perception led to the enactment of RFRA to restore the
compelling interest test abandoned by Smith. This Article has analyzed
post-Smith and post-RFRA responses by federal land managers and fed-
eral courts to Indian religious exercise claims related to sacred sites on
public lands. Federal land managers have developed plans at some sites
that provide significant protection for Indian religious exercise and have
successfully defended them against Establishment Clause challenges. At
other sites, however, land managers' decisions have excessively bur-
dened religious exercise for the benefit of other interests, leading to
RFRA-based challenges by religious practitioners. The results of these
challenges to date have been mixed, with some of them showing the con-
tinuing significance of pre-RFRA cases like Smith and Lyng.
Recent efforts to evaluate and update policies and procedures for
addressing Indian religious exercise needs on public lands, coupled with
the 2010 U.S. endorsement of UNDRIP, suggest that the time is ripe for
improving agencies' responsiveness to Indian religious freedom claims.
480. State Dep't UNDRIP Announcement, supra note 464, at 2.
481. Id. at 14.
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of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2378 (Nov. 16, 1993).
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If this hope becomes a reality, the promise of protection that Congress
made over thirty years ago in AIRFA-to "protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the[ir] traditional religions . . . including. . . access to sites "484
could at long last be fulfilled.
In closing, it is important to acknowledge how much is at stake in
the struggle to protect religious exercise at sacred sites. Speaking at the
time of another important anniversary-the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the enactment of AIRFA-Judge Carey Vicenti of the Jicarilla Apache
Nation commented that the greatest loss that tribes have suffered has
been the loss of lands. Although certain rights in the lands were extin-
guished, a crucial aspect of tribal ties to lands, however, was not lost:
[T]hat radiant sense of belonging that we had to these lands that we
lost.... remained in our hands... .The people from whom we came
still belong . . . to the sacred sites that exist all across the continent.485
Maintaining this sense of belonging is, Judge Vicenti explained, inextri-
cably bound up with resisting conquest:
[W]hat has happened over the past several hundred years has been a
constant effort at conquest. This conquest is not complete and won't
be complete until eventually that radiant sense of belonging is extin-
guished.... That is, in essence, what we are fighting for ... : we
have to retain . . . that beautiful and radiant sense of belonging to the
country from which we come. For this reason we can't stop ... our
efforts to try to protect our religious ceremonies, to protect the sacred
sites to which we belong.486
From this perspective, it seems impossible to overstate either the signifi-
cance of what is at stake where sacred sites on public lands are under
threat, or the weight of the corresponding responsibility of federal land
managers and courts, to protect Indian religious exercise rights at sacred
sites and thus not make conquest complete.
484. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
485. Carey N. Vicenti, Douglas Long & Chief Arvol Looking Horse, Religious Freedom and
Native Sovereignt-Protecting Native Religions Through Tribal, Federal, and State Law, 19
WICAZOSA REV. 185, 186(2004).
486. Id.
4312012]1

